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NOTES
UNWED FATHERS AND THE ADOPTION PROCESS
The rights of unwed fathers in the adoption of children born out
of wedlock have undergone rapid and fundamental change in recent years.1 Only eight years ago, the prevailing view in most states
was that the unwed father had no such rights: courts ignored him2
and accorded the unwed mother full authority to place the child
for adoption. This practice of granting the unwed father little or
no input before terminating his parental rights' came to an abrupt
halt in 1972 when the United States Supreme Court decided Stanley v. Illinos.4 The Court in Stanley announced that an unwed
1. Several law review articles discuss the nature and extent of these changes. See generally Barron, Notice to the Unwed Fatherand Termination of ParentalRights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527 (1975); Schwartz, Rights of a Fatherwith Regard to
His Illegitimate Child, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1975); Tabler, ParentalRights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAm. L.
231 (1971); Comment, Protecting the Putative Father'sRights After Stanley v. Illinois:
Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115 (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 13
J. FAM. L.]; Comment, Illegitimacy and the Rights of Unwed Fathersin Adoption Proceedirgs After Quilloin v. Walcott, 12 J. MAN. J. PRAc. & PROC. 383 (1979); Note, Father of an
Illegitimate Child-His Right To Be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1071 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Note, 50 MINN. L. REv.]; Note, The Putative Father's Parental Rights: A Focus on
"Family," 58 NEB. L. REv. 610 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, 58 NEB. L. REV.]; Note,
The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: ProvidingNotice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REv. 517 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, 59 VA. L. REv.]; 40 AL.
L. REv. 543 (1976); 18 How. L.J. 843 (1975); 1968 U. ILL. L.F 232; 18 WASHBURN L.J. 174
(1978).
2. See, e.g., Comment, 13 J. FAM. L., supra note 1, at 115. Before Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972), even if the unwed father had acknowledged paternity of, supported, and
established a family relationship with his child, the state did not recognize his interests.
Comment, 13 J. FAM. L., supra note 1, at 115 (citing Clements v. Banks, 159 So. 2d 892 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964), and Toole v. Gallion, 221 Ga. 294, 144 S.E.2d 360 (1965)).
Initially, most states granted an unwed father no connection with his child born out of
wedlock other than the moral obligation of support. See Note, 50 MINN. L. REv., supra note
1, at 1072.
3. Adoption terminates all legal relationships and rights between the child and his natural
parents and establishes those rights in the adoptive parents. See, e.g., In re Fox, 567 P.2d
985 (Okla. 1977).
4. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

WILLIAM AND

MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:85

father's relationship with his nonmarital children was protected by
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, and that before a court could terminate the father's
parental rights, it was required to provide him a hearing to determine his fitness5 as a parent.6 No longer could the state sever his
rights on the basis of an absolute statutory presumption of
unfitness.
Six years after Stanley, the Court suggested in Quillorn v.
Walcott that it might expand the rights of the unwed father to
include the right to veto the adoption of his children absent a findIng that he was unfit, but declined to do so on the basis of the
parental relationship at issue in that case. Most recently, in Caban
v. Mohammed,' the Court gave substance to its suggestions in
Quilloin and, employing an equal protection analysis, reserved for
certain unwed fathers a role in the adoption process identical to
that of the unwed mother.9
The rapid evolution of the law through these three cases introduced a considerable amount of uncertainty into the adoption process. These developments invalidated many state adoption statutes, and legislatures still are uncertain how to provide for the
unwed father's expanding role in adoption proceedings. The dissenting Justices in Caban addressed many of the more pressing
concerns over enfranchising the unwed father. 10 They feared that
unwed fathers exercising their new rights would delay and complicate adoptions 1 and thus interfere with the primary means of providing for the welfare of children born out of wedlock. They also
were apprehensive that the procedural due process requirement of
locating and notifying unwed fathers of proceedings affecting their

5. The traditional grounds for unfitness are abandonment or neglect. The Uniform Adoption Act has suggested that withholding consent unreasonably should be a third determinant of unfitness. UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT § 19 (amended 1971).
6. 405 U.S. at 649, 658.
7. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
8.441 U.S. 380 (1979).
9. The Court held the contested statute unconstitutional because the distinction it made
between the rights of unwed mothers and unwed fathers was not substantially related to the
state's interest in promoting the welfare of children. Id. at 382.
10. Justice Stewart penned one dissent, and Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, wrote the other.
11. 441 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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parental rights would invade unreasonably the mother's privacy 12
and cause prospective adoptive parents to doubt the reliability of
the new relationship.1 3 Because they believed most unwed fathers
in fact abandon the mother, forcing her to assume all the responsibilities of carrying, bearing, rearing, and supporting the child, the
Justices reasoned that mothers should have full authority to place
the child for adoption without any veto power in the unwed father. Furthermore, the dissenters posited that the Court should
limit its holding in Caban to its facts and not accord all unwed
fathers rights coextensive with those of unwed mothers. 15
The effect of Caban on state adoption statutes is unclear. This
Note will reassess the role of the unwed father in adoption proceedings and suggest appropriate changes in current adoption policies. In reconsidering the father's role, the Note evaluates the part
adoption has played in society and its adaptation to social changes,
the modifications of adoption law by the Supreme Court, and the
competing interests present in an adoption proceeding.
BACKGROUND

Adoption is a statutory creation" of fairly recent vintage. The
common law did not recogmze adoption, and states did not begin
to enact adoption statutes until the middle of the nineteenth cen7
tury.1
Previously, unwanted or destitute children generally were
placed with relatives who would accept them. If no relatives were
willing or available, indigent children were put into indenture, apprenticeship, or service. "8 As a rule, "direct care of destitute children by American municipalities prior to 1875 was . . a pitiful

12. Id. at 408-09.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 406-07.
15. Id. at 409.
16. In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 570, 331 N.E.2d 486, 487, 370
N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Orsini v. Biasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976).
See generally Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAD. L. REv. 743
(1956); Presser, The HistoricalBackground of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L.
443 (1972).
17. The first adoption statute was enacted in Massachusetts in 1851. Presser, supra note
16, at 474.
18. Id. at 456-61.
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failure."1 9
About 1875 public attention began to focus on the welfare of the
growing number of unwanted children, and private agencies
emerged to fill the gap left by the state's indifference. Although
older children remained a source of cheap labor, these agencies
sought to place young children in suitable homes where they could
benefit from a family atmosphere. Because an unindentured child
could not be bound to a family, reformers pressed for statutes that
would recognize legally the new relationships. Gradually, interest
centered on using adoption as a means of providing for the welfare
of the child.20
Today, adoption is the legal process by which the state severs a
child's relationship with his natural parents and establishes a new
relationship between him and the adoptive parents. 21 This severance and reestablishment normally embraces all the rights, duties,
and privileges that inhere in the parent-child relationship,2 2 although some state statutes provide for special consequences regarding inheritance rights. 23 Adoption, however, is not the sole
means by which a court may terminate parental rights. Parents
who fail to provide for the proper care or support of their children
may lose custody and all parental rights through a neglect hearing.24 Similarly, parents who leave their children and fail to communicate with them for a statutorily prescribed period may
have
their rights terminated through an abandonment hearing. 25 In ei-

19.
cited
20.
21.

H. FOLKS, THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN 33 (1902),
in Presser, supra note 16, at 473 (citation omitted).
Presser, supra note 16, at 472-74.
See, e.g., Bikos v. Nobliski, 88 Mich. App. 157, 276 N.W.2d 541 (1979); In re Fox, 567
P.2d 985 (Okla. 1977); S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL-THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY
BREAKDOWN

131, 132 (1971).

22. These factors are determined by statute, but normally include the parents' rights to

custody, control, and services of the child, and the child's rights to support and instruction
from the parents.
23. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 658 (1968).
24. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-4(B)(3) (Supp. 1979). This statute provides for termination of parental rights when the child has been neglected or abused and when the court
finds that the conditions and causes of the neglect or abuse are unlikely to change despite
reasonable efforts by state welfare agencies to assist the parent.

25. See, e.g., In re Ellick, 69 Misc. 2d 175, 328 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Fain. Ct. 1972); N.Y. Soc.
§ 384-b(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80) (requiring a period of six months in
which the parent did not visit or tommunicate with the child).
SERV. LAW
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ther case, the state frees the child from parental control and places
him either in a foster home2" or an adoptive home where he can
receive necessary care.
In contrast to such permanent separations is the process by
which a neglectful parent loses only custody rights. Although a
court will appoint someone other than the parent as the child's
guardian with right to custody, it will allow the parent to visit and
maintain contact with his child.2 7 If the parent is able to overcome
the deficiency, he then will regain custody of the child. This distinction is important because courts tend to require a significantly
stronger showing of unfitness to terminate parental rights than to
shift custody to a nonparent.
Despite the growing recognition that the focus in adoption proceedings should be on the child's welfare, many adoption statutes
before the landmark holding in Stanley regarded the child as little
more than a chattel of the parents. Courts generally applied a
strict parental rights doctrine that prevented termination of parental rights except in extreme cases of neglect or abandonment. The
state, though, respected only the parental rights of married parents
and unwed mothers. Unless they were unfit, their consent to the
adoption was a necessary prerequisite. The opposite was true of
unwed fathers; even when they had acknowledged paternity, provided support, and established a parental relationship with the
child, their consent was unnecessary.2 8
Courts considered this distinction both necessary and acceptable
because it facilitated the adoption process. Because most unwed
fathers had no interest in or relationship with their children, a requirement of locating and obtaining the consent of unwed fathers
would have impeded greatly the entire process.

26. The purpose of a foster home is to provide temporary care for the child pending location of a more permanent home. All too often, though, children spend many years in foster
care. See, e.g., In re Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1978) (ten years);
Coffey v. Department of Social Servs., 41 Md. App. 340, 397 A.2d 233 (1979) (nine years).
27. The state encourages such visitation and contact in order to promote the reestablishment of a Viable parent-child relationship. New York requires that social service agencies
exercise diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship before a
court may order termination of parental rights. See In re Thomas TT, 67 A.D.2d 788, 412
N.Y.S.2d 482 (1979).
28. See note 2 supra.

[Vol. 22:85
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To require the consent of fathers of children born out of wedlock
would have the overall effect of denying homes to the
homeless and of depriving innocent children of the other blessing of adoption. The cruel and undeserved out-of-wedlock
stigma would continue its visitations. At the very least,
the wor29
thy process of adoption would be severely impeded.
Although this presumption of unfitness may have been true in
most instances, its irrebuttable nature caused individual unwed fathers who had close, beneficial relationships with their children to
be severed from their children, often to the detriment and anguish
of both. Disturbed by the severe consequences of this presumption,
the Court in Stanley altered the course of adoption law.
THE SUPREME COURT AND ADOPTION

LAW

Stanley v. Illinois was the first of three major Supreme Court
decisions declaring that unwed fathers could have constitutionally
protected relationships with their children born out of wedlock.
Joan Stanley and Peter Stanley, though never married, had lived
together intermittently for eighteen years and had raised three
children. After Joan died, Illinois transferred legal custody of Peter's children to court-appointed guardians.3 0 At that tine, an Illinois dependency statutesi provided that children without "parents" were to be declared dependent and made wards of the state.
The statute defined "parents" to include married mothers and fathers, adoptive mothers and fathers, and unwed mothers, but excludedunwed fathers.3 2 Although the statute required a hearing to
determine fitness in the case of "parents," it contained the presumption that unwed fathers were unfit and denied them a fitness
hearing. The only evidence necessary to take the children from
their natural unwed father therefore was proof that the child's
mother had died. Thus, when the state showed that Joan Stanley
had died, the court terminated Peter Stanley's parental rights and
his children became wards of the state.
29. In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsim, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 572, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489, 370
N.Y.S.2d 511, 516 (1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976).
30. 405 U.S. at 646.
31. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-1, 702-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
32. Id. § 701-14 (amended 1973).
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The State of Illinois argued before the Supreme Court that the
statutory distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers
was permissible as a means of furthering the state's policy of providing for the welfare of children.13 The state further argued that
its presumption of unfitness of unwed fathers was reasonable because the great majority of unwed fathers in fact were unfit.3 4 The
Court, however, rejected this rationale.3 5
Decrying such "procedure by presumption,"3 6 Justice White's
majority opinion announced, on equal protection and due process
grounds, 7 that Stanley had a substantial interest" in the children
he "sired and raised"39 and was entitled to a hearing on his fitness
as a parent before the state could terminate his parental rights.
Although notice to the unwed father of legal action affecting his
parental rights was not at issue in Stanley, the Court noted that
the Illinois statute providing for notice by publication to "All
whom it may concern" was sufficient if the unwed father's identity
and location were unknown.40
Six years after Stanley, the Court decided Quilloin v. Walcott.

33. The precise aim of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act was to protect "the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community"
and to "strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be
adequately safeguarded without removal
"Id. § 701-2 (amended 1973).
34. 405 U.S. at 653 & n.5, 654 & n.6.
35. Id. at 654-55, 654 n.7. Assuming Illinois' presumption of unfitness of unwed fathers to
be true in the majority of cases, the Court noted that it was not true of Peter Stanley. Thus,
because the state's presumption was applied to unwed fathers like Peter Stanley, it did not
serve to advance the state's interest in the welfare of children. Id. at 654-55.
36. Id. at 656-57. The Court, though respecting the state's interest in protecting "the
moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the
community," id. at 652 (quoting ILL. ANN. STA. ch. 37, § 701-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972)
(amended 1973)), reminded Illinois that efficacious procedures used to realize legitimate
state ends did not always comport with the fourteenth amendments requirement of due
process. Id. at 656-57. In addition, the Court felt the state's additional burden of holding
fitness hearings for interested unwed fathers would be minimal. Id. at 657 n.9.
37. As a matter of due process, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his parental fitness
before his children could be taken from him. By denying him a hearing and according one to
all other parents, the state denied him equal protection of the laws. Id. at 649.
38. The majority acknowledged the interest of parents in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children, and in the integrity of the family. The Court considered these rights vitally important regardless of the parents' marital status. Id. at 651-52.
39. Id. at 651.
40. Id. at 657 n.9.
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The factual record presented in Quilloin regarding the degree of
the unwed father's interest in and responsibility for his child, however, was far different from that presented in Stanley After fathering the child and consenting to being named on the child's
birth certificate, 4 Leon Quilloin left all child-raising responsibilities to the child's mother, Ardell Walcott, and Randall Walcott,
whom she later married.4 2 In contrast to Peter Stanley, Leon Quilloin never lived with the child or sought his custody and never objected to Ardell and Randall's raising him.43 What little support he
provided was given on an irregular basis.44 The only interest Leon
manifested in the child was to visit 4 5 and occasionally bring him

presents. When Leon received notice 46 from the state's Department of Human Resources that Randall and Ardell, with whom the
child had been living for seven years, had petitioned for the child's
adoption, he objected.
Under the Georgia statute in effect at the time, the consent of
both parents of a child born in wedlock was required for an adoption, even if they were separated or divorced at the time of the
adoption proceedings. 47 For the adoption of a nonmarital child,
however, only the unwed mother's consent was necessary 48 Unwed
fathers had no right to prevent the adoption unless they had legitimated the child.49 Considering all the circumstances, 0 the state
41.
42.
43.
44.

434 U.S. at 249 n.6.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Although Quilloin had a duty to support the child under the Georgia statute, GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-202 (1973) (amended 1979), Ardell Walcott never brought an action to enforce this duty. Because he never had been under a court order to provide support, his
rights could not be terminated under the part of the statute that dealt with willful failure to
comply with a support order. See id. § 74-403(2) (1973) (amended 1977).
45. 434 U.S. at 251. Apparently, the disruptive effects these visits were having on the
child and the rest of the Walcott family prompted Randall Walcott to petition for the
child's adoption. Id.
46. As in Stanley, sufficiency of notice was not at issue.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(1) (1973) (amended 1977). This general rule had several exceptions: if the parent had surrendered his parental rights to a child-placing agency or an
adoption court; if he had abandoned the child or willfully failed to pay court-ordered support for more than a year; if his parental rights had been terminated by court order; if he
was incapacitated from giving consent; or if he could not be located after a diligent search.
Id. § 74-403(2) (1973) (amended 1977).
48. Id. § 74-403(3) (1973) (amended 1977).
49. Legitimation could be accomplished two ways: by marrying the mother and acknowl-
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court refused to grant Leon's petition for legitimation and wsitation rights as not in the child's best interests, even though it did
not find him to be unfit. The court then granted the Walcott adoption petition because Ardell Walcott consented and Leon Quilloin
had no further standing to object. 51
Leon's appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court 52 included an equal
protection and due process attack on the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute,5 3 but the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the
challenge on the ground that the state's strong interest in raising
children in a family setting would be impeded unnecessarily if unwed fathers could veto adoptions. The court found this particularly
true under the facts of this case, noting that the effect of the statute was to maintain the child in an existing family unit and to
prevent interference by a marginally interested biological father
who never had been part of the child's family and had not taken
any steps to support or legitimate him for eleven years."
Quilloin appealed to the United States Supreme Court, continuing to challenge the constitutionality of the Georgia statute and
claiming the absolute right to veto adoption of his child because
the lower court had not found him unfit. 5 The Court unanimously
dismissed the due process challenge on the basis that any protected interest Quilloin may have had in his child never ripened
because he never had a familial relationship with him. The Court
agreed with the state that under the circumstances presented in
this case, termination of Leon Quilloin's parental rights56 required

edging the child as his own, id. § 74-101 (1973), or by obtaining a court order declaring the
child legitimate, id. § 74-103 (1973).
50. The important factors in this determination were as follows: the irregular support; the
disruptive effect of Leon Quillom's visits on the child and the rest of the Walcott family; the
child's desire to be adopted by Randall Walcott and take on his name; Randall Walcott's
fitness as a parent; the marital relationship of Randall and Ardell Walcott; and Ardell
Walcott's custody of the child. 434 U.S. at 251.
51. Id. at 251-52.
52. Quillom v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), afld, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
53. Id. at 231, 232 S.E.2d at 247.
54. Id. at 233, 232 S.E.2d at 248.
55. 434 U.S. at 253.
56. Had the state attempted to break up a natural family unit over the objection of the
parents and children, without a showing of unfitness, and solely because such action appeared to be in the best interests of the children, the Court indicated that such state action
would be an unconstitutional abridgment of the due process clause. 434 U.S. at 255 (dictum)
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no more than a finding that this course of action was in the child's
57
best interests.
Furthermore, the Court rejected Quilloin's equal protection argument, which challenged the distinction in the Georgia statute
between separated or divorced fathers and unwed fathers." Noting
that separated or divorced fathers had borne full responsibility for
the raising of their children while they were married, the Court
concluded that Quilloin's lack
of commitment to his child justified
59
the differential treatment.
While Quilloin argued his case before the Supreme Court, another unwed father was fighting in the New York courts to prevent
termination of his parental rights. The Supreme Court ultimately
would decide this father's claim in Caban v. Mohammed. Abdiel
Caban and Maria Mohammed had lived together out of wedlock
and had two children.6 0 After they had lived together as a family
unit for about five years, Maria took the children and left Abdiel
to move in with Kazim Mohammed, whom she married two
months later. For the next nine months, the children spent weekdays living with Kazim and Maria and weekends at their maternal
grandmother's apartment, where Abdiel visited them.6 1 With the
Mohammeds' encouragement, the maternal grandmother took the
children to Puerto Rico for more than a year.6 2 Subsequently, Abdiel went to Puerto Rico and brought them back to New York. The
Mohammeds, after filing for and receiving custody, then petitioned

(quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)). The Court, however, emphasized that it was deciding only this particular case.
Id. at 256.
57. Id. at 254-55.
58. Quilloin's equal protection challenge concerned only the statute's differential treatment of married and unwed fathers. The Court ruled that it would not consider Quilloin's
gender discrimination challenge concerning differential treatment of unwed mothers and unwed fathers, which he had argued before the Georgia courts, because the claim was not
presented in Quilloin's jurisdictional statement. Id. at 253 & n.13.
59. Id. at 256.
60. "Abdiel Caban was identified as the father on each child's birth certificate." 441 U.S.
at 382.
61. Because Caban was on good terms with the maternal grandmother, he was able to
visit the children each week while they stayed with her. Id.
62. While the children were in Puerto Rico, Maria Mohammed wrote them letters and
Abdiel Caban communicated with them through his parents, who also lived in Puerto Rico.
Id. at 382-83.
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for adoption of the children, and Abdiel cross-petitioned for adop63
tion on behalf of himself and his new wife.
Under the New York Domestic Relations statute in effect at the
time, unwed mothers had the right to veto the adoption of their
natural children by withholding their consent.6 4 The unwed father
had no such right and only could appear at the hearing to try to
show that the proposed adoption would not be in the child's best
interests.6 5 In effect, this provision allowed Maria to veto Abdiel's
petition, whereas Abdiel, lacking a corresponding veto power, only
could attempt to establish that the Mohammeds were unfit parents. Abdiel failed. Consequently, although he had acknowledged
his paternity and given the children his name, supported the family, established a substantial relationship with his children, and
was found not to be unfit, the court granted the Mohammeds' petition and terminated his parental rights.6 6 He appealed, claiming
the New York Domestic Relations Act unconstitutionally denied
him equal protection and due process contrary to the guarantees of
the fourteenth amendment. 67 The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court s and the New York Court of Appeals 9 rejected his appeals, but he finally prevailed before the United
States Supreme Court.
Although recognizing that the state's interest in facilitating
adoptions of children born out of wedlock was substantial, Justice
Powell's majority opinion nevertheless maintained that the statute
violated Abdiel's rights under the equal protection clause because
it drew a gender-based distinction "° bearing no substantial rela-

63. Id. at 383.
64. Section 111(1) of the New York Domestic Relations Law provided that "consent to
adoption shall be required
[o]f the parents or surviving parent
of a child born in
wedlock
[or] [o]f the mother
of a child born out of wedlock." N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 111(1) (McKinney 1977).
65. 441 U.S. at 385-87.
66. Id. at 383-84.
67. Id. at 384.
68. In re David Andrew C., 56 A.D.2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (mem.), afl'd mem., 43
N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977), rev'd sub nom. Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
69. In re David A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977) (mem.),
rev'd sub nom. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
70. The Court did not decide whether the state legitimately could distinguish between
unwed fathers and married or divorced fathers. 441 U.S. at 394 n.16. Although this was held
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tionship to the state's interest in furthering the adoption of children born out of wedlock.7' Because this case was resolved by
equal protection analysis alone, the majority did not discuss
whether Abdiel
Caban also presented a cognizable due process
72
argument.

The two dissenting opinions took vigorous exception to the majority's analysis. Justice Stewart emphasized the importance of the
state's interest in facilitating adoptions. He argued that because
adoption was the most available means of overcoming the social
and developmental handicaps faced by children born out of wedlock, unwed fathers who predominantly were unknown, unavailable, and uninterested, should not be allowed to place obstacles in
the path of adoption procedures. He favored allowing interested
unwed fathers to oppose adoptions only by showing that the proposed adoption would not be in the child's best interests 7 and insisted that full parental rights required more than a mere biological relationship between father and child.74
permissible in Quilloin, the thrust of the discussion in Caban counsels that such differential
treatment would not always be acceptable. Caban dealt at length with the impropriety of
foreclosing parental interests on the basis of absolute presumptions or generalizations not
always substantially related to the achievement of legitimate state interests. Clearly, differential treatment in the case of an individual unwed father with as poor a parental record as
Leon Quilloin is justified. After Caban, however, a statute allowing discrimination against
all unwed fathers as compared to all married or divorced fathers probably would not withstand constitutional scrutiny. See In re Mark T, 8 Mich. App. 122, 146, 154 N.W.2d 27, 39
(1967) (observing that the court was "not aware of any sociological data justifying the assumption that an illegitimate child reared by his natural father is less likely to receive a
proper upbringing than one reared by his natural father who was at one time married to his
mother).
71. 441 U.S. at 391. Although assuming that some generalizations concerning differences
in the relative importance of maternal and paternal roles at the time the child was a young
infant were appropriate, the majority maintained that as the child aged such generalizations
did not serve as a valid basis for terminating parental rights. Id. at 389.
At the time the adoption petitions were filed in Caban, Davis was four and Denise was six
years old. Id.
72. Id. at 394 n.16.
73. Id. at 396 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 397. Several Justices took this position in other cases. In Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), involving the status and rights of foster parents and
foster children under the due process and equal protection clauses, the Court noted that
"[bliological relationships are not exclusive determination of the existence of a family." Id.
at 843 (footnote omitted). In another context, the majority suggested that "at least where
the substantive protection of the Due Process Clause is involved, biological relationship
alone is not sufficient to create a constitutionally protected 'family.'" Id. at 843 n.50 (citing
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Justice Stevens, joined in his separate dissent by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, also emphasized the compelling importance of the state's interest in facilitating adoptions.75 Enumerating the many differences between maternal and paternal roles
during the child's infancy,7 8' Justice Stevens maintained that the
New York statute's discrimination against unwed fathers was justified. He felt that requiring the consent of both unwed parents in
each case would lead to numerous problems, including complications and delays in the adoption process, invasion of the mother's
privacy by attempts to identify and locate the unwed father, and
discouragement of prospective adoptive parents.1 He asserted that
because the majority of adoptions involved infants7 8 and because
the discrimination was especially justified in infant adoptions, the
law should be presumed valid and unwed fathers attacking the
statute should be required to prove the classification faulty so
often that its invalidation would be justified.7 0 Agreeing that once
developed, a father's relationship with his child was constitutionally protected against arbitrary state action, Justice Stevens concluded that he would expand the grounds justifying termination of
parental rights from abandonment and abuse to include cases in
which the father had taken no steps to legitimate his child, the
natural family unit already had been destroyed, and the child's
best interests required that no further obstacles should deprive
him and the state of the benefits of adoption and legitimation.
In its opinions in Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, the Supreme
Court explicated the constitutional principles relative to certain as-

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 536-40 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 549
(White, J., dissenting)).
75. Justice Stevens stopped short of finding that the state's interest in facilitating adoption was "compelling" in the sense of compelling the conclusion that any statute intended to
foster that interest was automatically constitutional. Instead, the level of scrutiny he suggested was one of "thoughtful attention" to the legislative judgment that the law served the
state interest in facilitating adoption. 441 U.S. at 402 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 404-07.
77. Id. at 408-09.
78. Justice Stevens cited HEW statistics for the years 1974 and 1975, which indicated
that approximately 64% of the children adopted were less than one year old and 89% were
less than six years old. Id. at 404 n.7.
79. Id. at 409-10.
80. These factors resemble those operative in Quilloin. See text accompanying notes 4146 supra.
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pects of the adoption process. The most fundamental of these is
that constitutional protection extends to de facto families. Although biological relationships alone do not make a family, the
mere absence of legal ties does not mean that the family unit merits no constitutional recognition.
A second principle that the Court clearly enunciated was that
nothing in the Constitution prohibits states from terminating parental rights upon proof of unfitness.8 1 Indeed, the Court affirmed
that the state has a duty to separate children from parents who
have abandoned or neglected 82 them in a way seriously detrimental
to their physical and emotional well-being. At the other extreme,
the state lacks the authority to separate families without proof of
unfitness merely on the basis that it considers such a solution in
the best interests of the child.8" This protection extends to all de
facto families and is not solely dependent on a marital relationship
between the mother and father.
Another concern addressed in all three cases, though not at issue
in any of them, was provision of notice to all parents'whose parental rights were to be terminated. The Court indicated that a court
should provide such notice to all natural parents, even those whose
identity or whereabouts are unknown. Notice to interested unwed
fathers should present no difficulty because a state easily could ascertain both their identity and whereabouts. If neither were ascertainable, then publication of notice to "All Whom it May Concern"
would be sufficient to comply with the notice requirement, 84 even
though the likelihood of actual notice to the unknown father would
be remote.
The Court also provided some guidance for determining when a
particular parent's relationship with his child was of sufficient
character to warrant due process and equal protection safeguards.
In Quilloin, the Court held that the following factors, taken together, were insufficient to create a constitutionally protected parental relationship: acknowledgment of paternity; irregular
financial support; occasional visits with and gifts for the child; ab81. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 392 n.13; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 649, 652.
82. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 649.
83. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 255 (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
84. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 657 n.9 (dictum).
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sence of a finding of unfitness; and desire to continue visitations in
the future. At best, these attributes characterize an uncle-nephew
relationship; thus, Leon Quilloin was accorded no parental rights.
A biological connection with a child in itself was insufficient to
overcome a failure to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.
On the other hand, Stanley and Caban outlined those factors
that, in conjunction with biological fatherhood, were sufficient to
clothe the unwed father with full parental rights: living with the
child in a de facto family unit; providing for the child's care, supervision, support, and education; and establishing a familial relationship with the child. These indicia of parenthood, when combined
with the biological relationship, served to establish a constitutionally protected parental relationship. This relationship ensured protection against termination of parental rights absent proof of unfitness and guaranteed protection against gender-based
discrimination in the adoption process.
The Court also established guidelines to which the states must
adhere when devising statutory procedures for adoptions. The
Court clearly disapproved of the use of absolute presumptions
regarding fitness as a parent. This was emphasized in Stanley, in
which the court denounced the practice of "view[ing] people onewhen a finer perception could readily have been
dimensionally
achieved.""s Rather than make "overbroad generalizations"86 and
"undifferentiated distinctions,

87

the states must design their stat-

utory procedures "so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike."8 " The majority rejected the position taken by
several dissenting Justices that presumptions could serve as a basis
for differential treatment provided they were true in most cases.8 9
When such fundamental rights as those of parents to the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children were involved, the state must make these determinations on an individual
basis.
Despite the statements concerning constitutional requirements
in the adoption process, certain issues remain unresolved. One
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 655.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 391 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
441 U.S. at 398-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 404-14.
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shortcoming of this line of cases is that the disputes involved older
children. In this regard, these cases failed to represent the typical
adoption, which involves newborn children or young infants. The
Court addressed this problem in dictum in Caban, suggesting that
"the special difficulties attendant upon locating and identifying
unwed fathers at birth [might] justify a legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of newborns."90 Despite this implication, however, the majority specifically "express[ed] no view" on
this issue." If the Court ultimately were to adopt such a position,
states might be able to draft statutes that would assure smooth
functioning of the adoption machinery in these cases, where it is
most needed.
Another matter unaddressed by the Justices is the conflict between a mother's right to privacy and disclosure of information regarding the identity and whereabouts of the unwed father necessary to make notice meaningful. Proper resolution of this conflict,
as well as other issues not reached in Stanley, Quilloin, or Caban,
depends on a careful balancing of the competing interests involved
in an adoption. Once state legislatures assess the nature and
strength of these interests, they will be better equipped to enact
provisions that meet the needs of those involved in the adoption
process and that will withstand future legal attack.
THE NONMARITAL CHILD'S INTERESTS

HistoricalBackground
In a society whose fundamental organizational unit is the family,
disparate treatment of children born outside the family might be
expected. This has been true of western society, although the degree of differential treatment has varied. At common law during
the time of Blackstone, the principal difference between children
born of married parents and those born out of wedlock was that
the latter could neither be heir to anyone nor have any heirs except those of their own bodies. 9 2 "[A]ny other distinction
would, with regard to the innocent offspring of his parents' crimes,
90. Id. at 392 (dictum).
91. Id. at 392 n.i1.
92. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY:

LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

5 (1971).
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be odious, unjust, and cruel to the last degree. 9' ' 3

As the law developed, however, it incorporated other distinctions
between the rights of nonmarital children and children born in
wedlock, resulting in real discrimination against the nonmarital
child.94 One reason may have been the growing tendency to associate being born out of wedlock with moral disgrace. The common
view was that "[t]he bastard, like the prostitute, thief, and beggar,
belong[ed] to that motley crowd of disreputable social types which
society has generally resented, always endured." 9 Society intended
many of the early legal disabilities of nonmarital children to be
indirect punishment of the child's biological parents for their sin.
Another rationale for discriminating against nonmarital children
was that it advanced the state's interest in preserving the integrity
of the legally constituted family For whatever reasons, the stigma
of "illegitimacy" hampered the child born out of wedlock in his
pursuit of a normal life.
Accordingly, the nonmarital child fared poorly in the adoption
process and often was treated as little more than a chattel belonging to his natural parents. Because courts generally viewed the
child as being able to adapt easily to custodial and environmental
changes,96 they applied a rather strict parental rights doctrine 7 to
contests over custody of the child between natural parents and
prospective adoptive parents. The effect of this doctrine was to allow the natural parent to regain custody of the child from those
adults with whom he had been living, regardless of whether the
natural parent had any relationship with the child9" and regardless
93. 1 W BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 485-86 (Kerr 1857), cited
in H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 4-5 (1971). See generally R. MNOOKIN,
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 169-72

(1978).
94. See H.

KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 5 (1971) (citing W. HOOPER,
THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY IV (1911)). This was especially true on the Continent where children born out of wedlock faced severe legal disabilities.

95. Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. Soc. 215 (1939).
96. See Note, Naturalvs. Adoptive Parents:Divided Children and the Wisdom of Solomon, 57 IOWA L. REV. 171, 174 & nn.17 & 18 (1971).
97. This doctrine maintained that unless a natural parent was proved to be unfit or to
have abandoned his child, he had an absolute right to the custody of his child.
98. [Elven if the child is required to make some sacrifice to be with his natural
parent or adjust to a new environment, it does not necessarily follow that his
welfare will be correspondingly impaired. It may not be to the best interest of

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:85

of the emotional ties9 9 the child may have had with the family
from which he was being removed. The entire process focused on
the rights and interests of the adults involved; only infrequently
did courts acknowledge the interests of the child in deciding his
fate.
Modern Approach
The nature of American society and its attitude toward
nonmarital children have changed extensively in recent years.
Gone are the days of saddling the child born out of wedlock with
numerous disabilities. Echoing Blackstone, the United States Supreme Court has expressed strong disapproval of the earlier practice of discriminating against nonmarital children.
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent."'

This attitude represents the current approach in dealing with the
rights of nonmarital children vis-h-vis those of children born in
wedlock. The Court continued, "Courts are powerless to prevent
the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the
Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discrimmathe child to have every advantage. He may derive benefits by subordinating his
immediate interests to the development of a new family relationship with his
own parent, by giving as well as receiving. Thus, although a change in custody
from an outsider to a parent may involve the disruption of a satisfactory status
quo, it may lead to a more desirable relationship in the long run.
Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 96, 265 P.2d 888, 891-92 (1954) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
99. Nor can it be said that a child of such tender years-even now less than two
years old-may have formed such affectionate ties in its present home that it
would be difficult for it to adjust itself to a new environment; an infant at that
age easily forms new attachments.
Adoption of Harvey, 375 Pa. 1, 10, 99 A.2d 276, 280 (1953).
100. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 US. 164, 175 (1972) (citation omitted).
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tory laws relating to status of birth where
the classification is
justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise." 10
' 1 The Uniform Parentage Act goes even further and, as indicated in the comments, establishes the principle that "regardless
of the marital status of the parents, all children and all parents
have equal rights with respect to each other."'1 2
The stigma once associated with being born out of wedlock likewise is waning for several reasons. Each year, a greater percentage
of all children born are born out of wedlock.10 3 This increase is due
in part to the diminishing role of marriage0 in personal relationships and the growing acceptance of nonmarital sex. Because contraception and abortion make prevention of unwanted children
easier, a greater percentage of the children born truly are wanted.
In addition, state social service and welfare agencies can assist the
single mother if she wishes to keep and raise her children and a
greater number of women are doing so. 05 Also, the current emphasis on individualism and individual responsibility operates to free
the child of accountability for his parents' actions in conceiving
him out of wedlock. The cumulative effect of these circumstances
has been to reduce greatly the stigma associated with birth out of
wedlock. 06
In recent years, the nonmarital child also has received more attention in the adoption process. 0 7 States now envision adoption as
a means of providing for the child's needs. The courts' exclusive

101. Id. at 175-76 (citation omitted).
102. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 588 (master ed. 1979) (Commis-

sioners' Comments). The UPA has been adopted in whole or substantial part in the following states: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 579.
103. Statistics show that 5.3% of all births in 1960 were of children born out of wedlock.
This figure rose to 10.7% in 1970 and to 14.8% in 1976. BUREAU OF THE
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 65 (1978).

CENSUS,

U.S. DEP'T

104. Figures indicate that while the marriage rate in the United States has remained
steady at approximately 10 per 1,000 persons per year, the divorce rate has more than
doubled since 1960 to a rate of about 5 per 1,000 persons per year. Id. at 59.
105. The percentage of families headed by women has climbed from approximately 10%
in 1960 to almost 14% in 1977. Id. at 43.
106. Interview with Carolyn Byers, Social Worker, Unwed Mothers Specialist, Hampton
Department of Social Services, in Hampton, Virginia (Oct. 4, 1979).
107. These developments, of course, have improved the lot of all children involved in the
adoption process.
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emphasis on parental rights has been replaced with a heightened
awareness of the physical and emotional needs of the children
involved.
The traditional barometer of a child's welfare has been the degree to which his physical necessities have been accommodated.
Courts usually have little difficulty in assessing whether a child's
parents are providing sufficient economic support to meet his basic
requirements for food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment.
Some single parents may be unable to provide for a child's basic
needs even with the support provided by state welfare agencies; in
such instances, adoption by a two-parent family may be a practical
means of alleviating the child's support problems. If the unwed
parent is able to maintain at least a minimal level of support, however, no compelling reasons support removing the child from a caring mother or father and placing him for adoption in a two-parent
home: even the best physical care, in itself, is not sufficient to assure a child's healthy development. 0 8s Also under mounting attack
is the notion that two-parent homes are inherently preferable to
one-parent homes because the child receives more love and attention from two parents and because he has two role models. Despite
strong arguments on each side, 10 9 the emerging consensus is that

108. Recent social research indicates that a child needs more than excellent physical care.
Children raised in institutions, some of whom received excellent physical care, tended to be
behaviorally retarded in comparison to children reared in families. See the extensive citations in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

115 n.4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].

See also the results of a

recently completed seven year study of children in institutions in B.
SECOND CHANCE

TIZARD, ADOPTION,

A

(1979).

The Pennslyvania Adoption Act recognizes that the parental obligation is more than
financial. Failure to establish a personal relationship with the child within six months justifies termination of parental rights. In re Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1, 7, 387 A.2d 804,
807 (1978).
109. Those who advocate a preference for two-parent homes point to the results of a Yale
study indicating that the prolonged absence or death of one parent is highly detrimental to
children. In that study, 29% of the children under psychiatric care at the Yale Clinic were

from one-parent families.

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS,

supra note 108, at 16 & 114 n.2.

Proponents of two-parent homes also claim that for optimal development a child needs both
a male and a female role model in the home.
Advocates of the adequacy of single parent homes have challenged the above findings and
assert instead that one caring parent can fulfill the child's needs. Contrary to the role model
thesis, some child psychiatrists say that a child needs "mothering," not necessarily a
mother. "Mothering" is the nurturing of the infant's potential to trust and bind himself to a
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one-parent homes can be perfectly suitable for raising children.
Consequently, adoption agencies are turning to them as a valuable
adoption resource, particularly for older or disabled children who
are difficult to place. 110
Although a child's physical needs have been the traditional concern of courts, recent research and study has centered on the emotional needs of young children. Backed by extensive psychological
and psychiatric research, advocates of the welfare of children have
emphasized increasingly the necessity of assuring that adoption
proceedings address the emotional and psychological needs of children. Far from the malleable, adaptable creatures they were assumed to be, children are more psychologically delicate than adults
and more likely to suffer serious or permanent trauma if their emotional needs are ignored."' The most basic requirement is the
child's need to be an integral part of a secure family in which he
can develop deep emotional attachments with his parents and siblings."1 2 Crucial to the child is the sense of being wanted," 3 loved,
and cared for. If these primal needs are not met, the child has
great difficulty in maturing emotionally If he has shifted from
family to family and severed his emotional bonds repeatedly he
never may be able to recover from the trauma. He may lack selfconfidence and self-esteem, and be unable to form trusting rela-

human partnership. This essential capacity develops when the child is given affection, acceptance, approval, protection, care, control, and guidance, and is not dependent on the
parent's gender. S. FRAIBERG, EVERY CHILD'S BIRTHRIGHT: IN DEFENSE OF MOTHERING xii

(1977).
Acceptance of an unwed father as a proper parent is greater today than in the past:
[T]he development of a significant, loving relationship between the father and
the child is far different from that of the relationship between a child and
putative father as envisaged in the past, when putative fathers were generally
assumed to be birds of passage in the lives of children born out of wedlock.
Stone v. Chip, 68 Misc. 2d 134, 137, 326 N.Y.S.2d 520, 523-24 (Fain. Ct. 1971).
110. Interview with Mary Hutchens, Senior Social Worker, Adoptive Home Developer,

and Sharon Downes, Senior Social Worker, Foster Care Intake Worker, Newport News Department of Social Services, in Newport News, Virginia (Oct. 4, 1979).
111. See note 99 supra.
112. See generally Marcus, Equal Protection: The Custody of the Illegitimate Child, 11
J. FAM. L. 1 (1971).
113. True "wanting" and the resulting psychological benefits are absent when the adult
claims to "want" the child for reasons such as financial advantage, forcing a reluctant sexual
partner into marriage, or an ill-motivated desire to thwart the wishes of the other parent.
See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 108, at 21.
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tionships as an adult. 114 In addition, he may treat his children the
same way his parents treated him as a child, unknowingly refusing
them the sense of belonging and security they crave and perpetuating a vicious cycle of unsatisfactory parent-child relationships.1 5
The central figures in a young child's life are his "psychological"
parents." 6 Psychological parents are those adults who care for and
interact with the child on a daily basis. Any caring adult, including
unwed fathers, can fill this essential role. The biological relationship is irrelevant; a young child has no sense of biological or legal
ties.' 1 His sole concern is for the reality of the situation as he perceives it. His "parent" thus is the psychological parent, not a
stranger whose sole claim to him is a legal or biological connection." From the child's perspective, removal from his psychologi-

114. Virtually all courts profess to act in the child's best interests; however, "while zealously safeguarding the fundamental right of the parent, courts may ignore the equally fundamental right of the child to grow up in a stable and secure environment." Comment,
Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the Child, 14 J. FAM. L.
547, 550 (1975-76).
"Studies have shown
that constant shifting from home to home endangers the
growth-the mental and the emotional health-of the child." J. POW-ER, THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY

117 (1968). Research conducted by the senior research fellow

at the Thomas Coram Research Unit at the University of London revealed that two-thirds
of children displaced from de facto families and restored to their natural parents required
treatment for emotional and behavioral problems. These results, in combination with others
uncovered in the research, led to the conclusion that the critical element in the placement of
children is permanency. B. TIZARD, supra note 108.
This knowledge was applied in In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 682, 155 Cal. Rptr. 256
(1979), in which the court affirmed the termination of a rehabilitated mother's parental
rights. Her child had been placed with foster parents at the age of six months and lived with
them to the age of eight. At trial, a child psychiatrist testified that separation of the child
from her foster parents to return her to her mother, a virtual stranger, "would lead to grief
and a withdrawal of love and trust [which] would interfere with her capacity to form relationships in the future." Id. at 697, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
115. Interview with Richard Carter, Director, Catholic Home Bureau, in Newport News,
Virginia (Sept. 27, 1979). For reference to the growing body of psychological literature on
this point, see the authorities listed in BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 108, at 34,
127 n.3.
116. For a thorough discussion of this concept and its implications for child welfare ser-

vices, see

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS,

supra note 108.

117. Because young children have no concept of blood ties until late in their development,
they see as their "parents" those people who take care of and interact with them daily. Id.
at 12-13.
118. "It has been recognized that the psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the development of the child and its mental and emotional health than the
coincidence of biological or natural parenthood." Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 222, 377 A.2d
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cal parent is traumatic in the extreme. Courts and legislatures, in
undertaking to rearrange families to accomodate the "best interests of the child,"" 9 should consider carefully the child-psychological parent relationship.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADOPTION PROCESS

Unfortunate circumstances such as neglect, abuse, or abandonment of the child dictate that the state alter certain familial relationships. In making these rearrangements, courts strive to accomplish the objective in the manner least detrimental to the child.
Under Caban v. Mohammed, however, states now must accord certain unwed fathers consideration in the adoption process. The nascent issue in this area of the law is the extent to which states may
protect the child's interests without infringing the newly recognized rights of the unwed father.

628, 639 (1977) (citing 1 BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1969); 2 BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT
AND Loss (1973); BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 108; Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties,73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963);
26 RUTGERS L. REV. 693 (1973); 3 S'roN HALL L. REV. 130, 140 (1971)).
One extraordinarily farsighted court noted the following in 1881:
[WI]hen reclamation [of the child by its biological parent] is not sought until
a lapse of years, when new ties have been formed and a certain current given to
the child's life and thought, much attention should be paid to the probabilities
of a benefit to the child from the change. It is an obvious fact, that ties of
blood weaken, and ties of companionship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the
prosperity and welfare of the child depend on the number and strength of
these ties, as well as on the ability to do all which the prompting of these ties
compel.
[T] hey who have for years filled the place of the parent, have discharged
all the obligations of care and support, and especially when they have discharged these duties during those years of infancy when the burden is especially heavy
should be respected. Above all things, the paramount consideration is, what will promote the welfare of the child?
Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 653-54 (1881).
119.
The phrase, "best interests of the child," means all things to all people: it
means one thing to a juvenile judge, another thing to adoptive parents, something else to natural parents, and still something different to disinterested observers. If judges were endowed with omniscience, the problem would not be
difficult; but the tendency in man is to apply intuition in deciding that a child
would be "better" with one set of parents than with another, and then to express this intuitive feeling m terms of the legal standard of being "in the best
interests of the child."
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 207 N.W.2d 826, 831 (1973).
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Devote Greater Attentin to the Child and His Needs
The first requirement is to focus on the realities of the adoption
process from the child's point of view 120 Of all those involved, the
child is most sensitive, most easily damaged, and most intimately
and directly affected by the adoption.'21 Adoption proceedings
therefore should devote more attention and concern to the child
and his welfare to assure that he is the beneficiary, rather than the
victim, of the adoption process.'22
The exclusive concern for legal or biological claims to the child
as practiced through use of the parental rights doctrine 12 must be
subordinate to the child's need for maintaining the truly familial,
psychological relationships that are so essential to his emotional
health. Although he may have greater interest in his biological
roots as he nears adulthood, he has no such interest as a young
child. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Quilloin endorsed a substan120.

Ultimately then, when the competing interests of parent and child require a
decision that one must yield, that decision will inevitably be the result of a
value judgment. As society has evolved and its values have shifted, so too has
the judicial approach in this area of the law evolved from the limited consideration of only parental rights to an expanded approach that takes into account
the rights of children as well. The justification for child placement decisions
can no longer be limited to the categorical assumption that being with the biological parent will most adequately serve the needs of the child.
Comment, supra note 114, at 558 (citation omitted).

121. See E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-51 (2d ed. 1963); A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 159, 197 (1968); Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 807 (1944), cited in Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposalsfor Legislative Change, 49 S.
20 (1975).

122. See

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS,

CAL.

L.

REV.

10,

supra note 108, at 31-34; Watson, The Children of

Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 64, 71
(1969).
123. Many courts still adhere quite strictly to the parental rights doctrine. See, e.g.,
Adoption of R.A.B. v. R.A.B., 562 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Mo. 1978) (holding that adoption statutes should be construed strictly in favor of natural parents).
This attitude may be due in part to the hesitancy of some courts to deviate from statutory
provisions. See, e.g., In re Green, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2173, 2175 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1978)
(stating that "the court is not free to disregard statutory standards or requirements as a
basis for decision in favor of sociological principles that lack the discipline and restraints of
law. These must yield to the primacy of law in any case of apparent conflict."). But see, e.g.,
In re Adoption of Murray, 86 Cal. App. 3d 222, 150 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1978) (holding that statutory requirements of consent of natural parents should not be construed strictly in favor of
the rights of natural parents, but rather to promote the statute's objective of promoting the
welfare of children).
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tial relaxation of the parental rights doctrine when it upheld the
termination of Leon Quilloin's parental rights by application of a
best-interests-of-the-child standard. With the advent of artificial
insemination and fertilized egg implants, the social significance of
mere biological connections is diminishing. 124 Just as a man who
donates sperm used to artificially inseminate the wife of a sterile
husband has no rights in the child that results, an unwed father
who does no more should have no parental rights in the resulting

child.
Uphold De Facto Families
A fundamental principle derived from Stanley, Quillorn, and
Caban is that constitutional protection extends to de facto families
as well as traditional families. The importance of familial relationships, both to the state and the individual family members, stems
not so much from the fact of blood relationship as from the "emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association '125 and the role the family plays in "'promot[ing] a way of
life' through the instruction of children
",n Safeguarding the
integrity of de facto families is especially important for the children involved 127 because maintenance of secure, stable relation124. See Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (holding that a
sperm donor is not a parent in any legal sense), cited in J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE
FAMILY AND THE LAW 501 (1965). The same is true of a substitute mother who bears a child

for an infertile woman whose husband donated the sperm. See Girl Says She Had Baby for
Mother, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1964, at 30, col. 1, cited in J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, supra at
496.
A typical contemporary statute provides that when the husband and wife request and
consent to the use of artificial insemination the status of a child born thereby is the same as
that of a naturally conceived legitimate child of the couple. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (Repl.
Vol. 1976).
125. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
126. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)) (citation omitted).
127. Nowhere are the rights of children specifically enumerated, but they are implied in
neglect statutes and rules defining the duties and obligations owed by parents. One right
easily inferred is the right of a child to preservation of the de facto family in which he lives.
This right is necessary for the child to develop properly and gain a sense of belonging and
place in society. Whether such a right might reside in the "liberty" protected by the due
process clause was posed to the Supreme Court in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977). The Court seemed hesitant to find such a right in the foster family
context, but avoided a definite statement by deciding the case on other grounds. Id. at 847.
One commentator advocates that such an interest should fall within the ambit of the due
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ships is critical to their emotional and mental development. 128
Although upholding de facto families may seem desirable in the
abstract, application of this principle is often difficult, particularly
when it conflicts with parental interests. Courts are extremely reluctant, for example, to terminate the parental rights of an absent
biological father when his absence was due to some impediment
beyond his control. Courts that focus primarily on the rights and
interests of the parent tend to require proof of the absent parent's
intent to abandon or neglect the child and therefore pardon extended failures to exercise parental responsibilities if the parent
cites some colorable excuse. 129 Other courts, viewing the matter

process clause. Comment, 13 J.

L., supra note 1, at 121 n.34 (citing V DEFRANCIS,
8-10 (1971)).
Any liberty interest recognized in psychological relationships would have to be limited,
subject to the rights of biological parents who fulfilled their parental role. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 n.2 (1976). At
least one state has enacted legislation providing that foster parents are preferred in adoption of their foster children. Ch. 107, § 1, 1979 Tenn. Pub. Acts 11 (Bobbs-Merrill).
FAM.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS-BALANCING THE EQUITIES

128. See

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS,

supra note 108, at 31-34. See also In re Adoption

of a Child by I.T., 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (1978) (stating that for purposes of
adoption, the polestar for protection of the child's best interests is maintaining an existing
relationship in a stable home).
A report by the Urban Institute of Washington, D.C., claims that federal funding policies
favor foster care over adoption and thus indirectly encourage states to create the temporary
relationships characteristic of foster care rather than the permanent ones of adoption. THz
URBAN INSTITUTE, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD ADOPTION (1979). To remedy this problem, both
Houses of Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1979, which is
currently in conference. This bill provides for a new subsidized adoption program with federal matching funds and requires that states attempt to prevent the removal of a child from
his de facto family. H.R. 3434, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
129. The following are examples of cases in which courts have required proof of intent to
abandon or have excused failure to establish a relationship with the child when the parent
was not at "fault"- In re Carson, 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1080, -, 382 N.E.2d 1116,
1118-19 (1978) (denying stepparent adoption when the biological father's lengthy absence
was due to the mother's intransigence; strong dissent in favor of termination of the biological father's parental rights in cases of lengthy absence); In re Linehan, - Minn. -, -, 280
N.W.2d 29, 33 (1979) (denying stepfather adoption when the natural father had not supported or visited the child for four years because he was frustrated by the natural mother
and experienced financial and emotional problems); In re Thomas TT, 67 A.D.2d 788, 412
N.Y.S.2d 482 (1979) (denying termination of parental rights when the father's failure to
visit the child was due to Ins incarceration and later to his inability to afford an automobile); In re Anita PP, 65 A.D.2d 18, 410 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1978) (refusing to terminate the
natural father's parental rights when neglect of the children was excused because of unusual
circumstances of his employment and failure of the social service agency effort to strengthen
parental ties); In re Green, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2173, 2173 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (refusing
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from the child's vantage, conclude that fault is irrelevant to questions of parental absence. 30° If the child has formed close, emotional attachments to his psychological parents, he will suffer
grievously from being torn from his de facto family and placed in
the custody of the biologically related stranger, regardless of the
reason for the stranger's absence. Under these circumstances, the
better view is to prefer the child's immediate needs over the absent
parent's dormant parental interests. For this reason, abandonment
and neglect statutes providing for termination of parental rights of
parents who have no personal, familial relationship with their children should not require a finding of intent to abandon or fault in
failing to maintain contact. As was the case in Quilloin, courts
should terminate the parental rights of absent or neglectful parents who have had no substantial relationship with their children
if the best interests of the child would be served, especially when
this serves to strengthen the child's de facto family
Another difficult area in which some courts decline to uphold de
facto families is the illegal placement of a child with a family
through the gray market' 3 ' or black market.13 2 Even when the infant has lived with his new parents a year or more, some courts
will remove him from their custody on the rationale that to allow
the adoptive parents to keep him would be to encourage violation
of the law. 133 The result is that the child who had no control over

to terminate the natural mother's parental rights when the court required proof of intent
"to repudiate or renounce all rights and responsibilities of parenthood and a settled purpose
to be rid of them").
130. The following are examples of cases in which intent and fault were irrelevant to the
issue of abandonment: Lapinsky v. Shonk, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
(terminating parental rights when the father's failure to communicate with the child was
due to the father's incarceration); In re W.M., III, 482 Pa. 123, 393 A.2d 410 (1978) (affirming termination of parental rights for failure to perform parental duties for over seven
years; not necessary to show intent to relinquish parental claims).
131. A gray market adoption is one in which an intermediary, usually a doctor, lawyer, or
clergyman, places the child with the adoptive family for the mother without charge.
132. A black market adoption is one in which the intermediary who places the child for
the mother does so for a fee, usually paid by the adoptive parents. See generally N. BAKEE,
BABY SELLING: THE SCANDAL OF THE BLACKMARKET ADOPTION

(1978).

133. A New Jersey court recently heard a case illustrating this point. A couple had paid
$5,000 to an Arizona attorney for an infant, in violation of a strict New Jersey statute.
Although the adoptive parents had custody of the child for more than a year by the time of
the hearing, the court refused to allow them to adopt the child and ordered that he be
removed from their custody, primarily to uphold the integrity of the law. In re Adoption by
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his placement and already has suffered one traumatic dislocation is
punished by another painful separation. The inhumanity of this
approach has been declaimed by courts more sympathetic to the
child's needs.13 4 These courts have pointed out that penalties for
violation of statutes should be imposed on those responsible and
not those innocent of any wrongful conduct. When the method of
placement already has created an undesirable situation because of
its illegality, compounding the harm is equally undesirable. The
least detrimental alternative is to allow the child to remain in his
familial setting, provided it is not deleterious to his physical or
emotional health.' s

I.T. and K.T., 162 N.J. Super. 587, 394 A.2d 120 (Hudson County Ct.), rev'd, 164 N.J.
Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (App. Div. 1978). See note 134 infra.
134. See, e.g., In re Adoption by I.T. and K.T., 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (App.
Div. 1978). The court reversed a trial judge's order removing an infant from the home in
which it had lived for over a year. The appellate court stated that, even though the adoptive
parents had participated in an illegal placement through the black market, removal of the
child from its home would be too traumatic to condone. "In the absence of a clear legislative
mandate, the child's opportunity for a happy and productive life should not be frustrated
solely as a means of penalizing the adoptive parents." Id. at 486, 397 A.2d at 345 (citing In
re Shaheen, 127 N.J. Eq. 75, 11 A.2d 73 (1940); In re Lang, 9 A.D.2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763
(1959), affd, 7 N.Y.2d 1029, 166 N.E.2d 861, 200 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1960)).
135. For an example of a current statute intended to discourage unauthorized placements
by recommending denial of adoption petitions, see the Virginia Code, which provides that
[i]n cases where the preliminary investigation reveals that the child was placed
in an adoptive home in the Commonwealth by a person who is not authorized
to make such placements
., the Commissioner shall so inform the court
wherein the petition for adoption is filed and so state his disapproval thereof.
VA. CODE § 63.1-223(b)(3) (Supp. 1979). The Joint Subcommittee on the Placement of Children for Adoption drafted this section in 1978 out of a concern for the impact on the future
well-being of children placed by intermediaries. The subcommittee identified numerous
risks associated with intermediary placements such as the encouragement of black market
operations, the possibility that go-betweens might reveal the identity of adoptive parents to
natural parents, and the lack of permanency that a child would experience were he returned
by adopters. In addition, the subcommittee noted that such extralegal placements might
result in custody contests prior to finalization of an adoption, in the intermediary not informing the adoptive parents of critical information regarding the child's background, and
in lack of counseling for the natural parents. JOINT SUBCOMM. ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION, S. Doc. No. 18, General Assembly of Virginia 3, 6-8 (1978).
Despite the many disadvantages of using an unlicensed intermediary to place children for
adoption, the joint subcommittee found that adoptive parents often preferred them over
licensed child-placing agencies because of the long waiting lists at licensed agencies, the
time-consuming procedures of such agencies, including the home study, investigation of the
child's background, parental rights termination procedures, and their selective screening of
adoptive parents. Other factors cited were the expense of licensed-agency adoptions, lack of
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Another statutory provision that would be helpful in maintaining de facto families is one providing that final adoption decrees
may not be attacked on any grounds after six months. 136 If a family fraudulently obtains an adoption or a court fails to follow
proper procedures regarding consent and notice, the challenger
nevertheless should be required to assert promptly such claims in
his attempt to overturn the adoption. Time is most critical to the
child. By the time the court enters the final order of adoption, a
child already has begun to develop substantial ties to his new par-

lack of public awareness of the intricacies of the adoption process, and the privacy that
adoptive parents must surrender in the course of a home study. Id. at 8-9.
Not only did the subcommittee find that adoptive parents were discouraged from using
licensed agencies, but it also discovered that natural parents preferred independent placements through intermediaries. Unlike many independent arrangements, licensed agencies
are unable to give financial assistance to the mother to help cover medical and other expenses; therefore, she must undergo the trouble and embarrassment incident to applying for
this aid at a welfare office. Many mothers are unwilling to become involved with all those
who must be parties to adoptions through licensed agencies, such as the unwed father, the
courts, and even the agency itself. In addition, parental pressure may encourage some unwed mothers to "hush up" the matters associated with the birth, and this is better accomplished through an independent placement. The joint subcommittee noted further that private placements often are preferred to those through licensed agencies because many unwed
mothers trust the intermediary, who may be a clergyman, attorney, or doctor, more than
they trust a licensed authority. Many natural parents also are unaware of the existence or
importance of the services offered by licensed child-placing agencies and tend to perceive
independent placements as much simpler and involving less red tape. Id. at 9-10.
In light of these findings, the subcommittee drafted recommendations that, while recognizing the child's right to a secure, permanent home, at the same time advocated that placements made by unauthorized persons not be allowed to ripen into adoptions. The subcommittee did not mention the possibility of great damage to young children who had lived with
new families for a year or more before adoption was sought. Neither did they recommend
that the Department of Welfare be granted discretion to approve of certain adoptions when
the child already had become attached firmly to his new family. The subcommittee instead
recommended that the State Department of Welfare, the Attorney General's Office, and the
Commonwealth's Attorney diligently enforce the policy of disapproving child placements by
unauthorized intermediaries. Id. at 11-12. In light of current knowledge that such a policy
may have serious detrimental effects on the innocent children who are removed from families to which they already have become attached psychologically, the Commonwealth's policy should be revised to prescribe approval of adoptions resulting from unauthorized placements when the adoptive family is found to be suitable and the child has become attached
emotionally to his new family. The Commonwealth's interest in deterring unauthorized
placements can be realized more justly and more effectively by directing legal sanctions
against those who procure the unauthorized placements, particularly the intermediaries.
136. Professor Bodenheimer recommended this provision to the California legislature for
inclusion in revisions of the state's adoption laws. See Bodenheimer, supra note 121, at 7576.
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ents and siblings. The passage of another six months will see these
relationships so firmly established that their termination would
cause substantial harm to the child.
A fair balancing of the child's need for familial stability against
an adult's desire to set aside an improperly executed adoption requires that no attempts to defeat the adoption be allowed after the
passage of a reasonably short period of time. The state still would
have the means to punish those who acted fraudulently or unlawfully if such conduct is discovered after the six month limitation
period. The only remedy that should be excluded from such later
actions is that of nullifying the adoption. To require severance of
the child's new emotional bonds at such a late date would serve
only to compound any harm already done. In this respect, this provision is similar to the one discussed earlier regarding nontermination of placements merely because they were made illegally
through an intermediary The function of both is the same: to uphold de facto families to assure the stability and security of the
child's relationships.
Free Unwanted Children for Adoption Sooner
The foregoing suggestions are relevant to situations in which the
child has been living with a de facto family instead of his natural
family and at least one absent parent or the state seeks to terminate that relationship. When an unwed mother desires to place her
newborn child, however, the procedures that protect the child's interests are equally critical. Indeed, one of the primary reasons that
the dissenting Justices in Caban objected to recognizing substantial parental rights in unwed fathers was the apprehension of
greatly impeding the adoption process when newborn or infant
children were involved. For newborn infants, time is a pressing
matter. The child's dependency is greatest at birth and his need
for a stable, secure relationship with some caring parent is urgent.
A child's first months also are critical to his future development,
and stress and insecurity at this time in his life are bound to have
seriously detrimental aftereffects. The sooner he is placed in a permanent adoptive home, the better the chance that the adoptive
parents will be able to form relationships with the child very simi-
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lar to those of natural parents."5 7
Legislatures therefore should structure adoption statutes to provide the child with a greater measure of protection during this crucial period. A practical method of achieving this result would be to
decrease the length of time that a parent may avoid assuming his
responsibilities before he is declared to have abandoned or neglected his child.'1s Some authorities have suggested ninety days as
an appropriate time limit consonant with both the immediate
needs of the child for a secure home and the interests of parents
who are unsure whether they are prepared to assume the roles and
responsibilities of parents. 3 9 In Caban, the Supreme Court indicated that such provisions applicable in the case of newborn adoptions might be permissible if they were drawn precisely to achieve
the state's interest in protecting the welfare of children and did
not prevent unreasonably the interested biological parents from assuming their parental roles. If ninety days seems an extremely
short length of time, two factors must be considered. First, this
period is just half of that now used in several states as a basis for
terminating parental rights to children of all ages.14 ° Second,
ninety days to the very young may seem an eternity If the primary
goal of an adoption is to secure the child's welfare, his sense of
time should be considered as well as that of adults.
137. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, INC., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA
STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 6, 28 (1968)

[hereinafter cited as CWLA STANDARDS].

138. Several social services adoption specialists have voiced this concern. Recognizing
that an unwed mother or unwed parents may have great difficulty making such an important decision, they nevertheless agree that a timely decision must be made in order to safeguard the child's best interests. Interview with Carolyn Byers, Social Worker, Unwed
Mothers Specialist, Hampton Department of Social Services, in Hampton, Virginia (Oct. 4,
1979); Interview with Mary Hutchens, Senior Social Worker, Adoptive Home Developer,
and Sharon Downes, Senior Social Worker, Foster Care Intake Worker, Newport News Department of Social Services, in Newport News, Virgmia (Oct. 4, 1979).
139. Interview with Carolyn Byers, Social Worker, Unwed Mothers Specialist, Hampton
Department of Social Services, in Hampton, Virginia (Oct. 4, 1979); Interview with Mary

Hutchens, Senior Social Worker, Adoptive Home Developer, and Sharon Downes, Senior
Social Worker, Foster Care Intake Worker, Newport News Department of Social Services, in
Newport News, Virginia (Oct. 4, 1979).
140. See, e.g., In re Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1, 387 A.2d 804 (1978) (terminating

parental rights under a Pennsylvania statute, after failure to establish a parental relationship with the child for six months).
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Avoid Multiple Placements
If, despite all efforts to maintain the child's de facto family, the
need arises to remove him from that family and place him in another, a state still can take certain measures to assure that the
transition causes the least possible detriment. The foremost of
these is to avoid multiple placements.14 The more times a child is
forced to break his psychological ties, the greater the chance his
development will be retarded and his ability to form lasting attachments impaired. 4 2 For this reason, all placements should be as
permanent as possible under the circumstances.
Eliminate Unnecessary Delays
To further minimize potential harm in placing children, states
must reduce the time needed to finalize adoptions. 4 During the
time in which the child's familial status is in limbo, both he and
the adoptive parents are hesitant to form strong bonds that may
be broken if the adoption is not approved. Alternatively, if the
child spends this interim period in foster care, neither the child
nor foster parents will be able to avoid establishing some emotional
ties. The longer the process, the stronger these ties will become
and the more difficult their severance if for any reason the adoption is denied.
Many states have specific requirements relating to giving notice
of the adoption and locating and terminating the rights of absent
141. "Studies have shown
that constant shifting from home to home endangers the
growth-the mental and the emotional health-of the child." J. POLMER, supra note 114, at
117.
142. "'The consensus of expert opinion holds that it is most important to avoid multiple
placements for children between six months and three years of age. Each additional placement may retard the development and may impair their ability to form lasting attachments.'" In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63, 71 (1979) (quoting
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Childrenfrom their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of ParentalRights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 625, 695 (1976)). The court continued, stating
that "[tihe avoidance of lasting psychological harm is the compelling state interest behind
prompt severance of the parental relationship." Id. at 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
143. "Speed [in adoptions] is essential because of the need to place the child as soon as
possible. Prompt placement serves both the child's need for early parental care and the
natural desire of adoptive parents to begin caring for their child soon after birth." Note, 59
VA. L. REV. 517, supra note 1, at 523 (citing CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 137, at 6, 28).
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biological parents, particularly unwed fathers. These procedures
are by far the worst offenders of expediency Indeed, one of the
prime concerns of the dissenters in Caban was that delays would
occur in the adoption process if the state were required to give notice and opportunity for a hearing to all unwed fathers. Yet the
Court has held that even if the identity or whereabouts of a biological parent are unknown, an honest attempt to notify him still
must be made. The Court also has indicated that notice by publication is sufficient to fulfill this requirement. To avoid unnecessary
delays, the length of time of such publication should be related to
several factors: the extent of the absent parent's relationship with
the child; the age of the child; and the likelihood of such notice
being effective. The more tenuous the relationship, the younger the
child, and the lesser the likelihood that actual notice will be given,
the more appropriate a short period of publication becomes. On
the other hand, the more substantial the father's relationship, the
older and more secure the child, and the greater the likelihood that
actual notice may be effected, the more appropriate a longer period
of publication will be. Because these factors vary from case to case,
courts must have the authority to weigh the competing factors and
set a period of time for publication that prevents unnecessary delay in the adoption process while assuring a genuine attempt to
notify the absent parent.
Variations among courts in the length of time required for publication of notice could be minimized effectively if the legislature
prescribed minimum and maximum time periods and set guidelines for determining the appropriate duration of publication. The
time range suggested should vary from a minimum of fifteen days
for newborn adoptions when the father's identity and whereabouts
are unascertainable, to a maximum of thirty days for an older child
whose absent parent's identity and general whereabouts are
known. As endorsed by the Supreme Court in Caban, failure to
respond to such notice is a sufficient basis upon which to order
termination of the unwed father's parental rights and to allow the
adoption to proceed.
Place Children Primarily Through Licensed Placement Agencies
If a child is removed from one family and placed in another, the
state should prescribe the process and conditions under which this

[Vol. 22:85

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

transition takes place. Authorities have debated the merits of placing children through a licensed child-placing agency as opposed to
allowing the unwed mother herself, or with the assistance of some
kind of intermediary, to make the placement. Studies have reached
conflicting conclusions regarding the success of adoptions under
44
each method.2
From the child's point of view, the scales tip toward requiring
placements through professional agencies licensed and controlled
by the state. These agencies provide many important services unavailable through intermediaries.1 4 5 The first of these are counseling services. Many unwed mothers are extremely anxious and
under great pressure when their child is born. Frequently, family
members offer conflicting advice. No one benefits when such a fundamental question as whether to keep one's child is made under
undue stress. Through counseling, an unwed mother may become
aware of her alternatives, such as applying for financial assistance
and other services that would make it possible for her to keep the
child. Conversely, she may realize that she is not ready to assume
the duties and responsibilities attendant to providing the care and
attention the child will need. Either way, the mother makes a more
informed decision, one that she is less likely to regret. This aspect
is important for the child as well. If the mother realizes at an early
date that she cannot accept parental responsibilities, the child may
be available for adoption sooner. If, on the other hand, his mother
realizes that with certain available assistance, she can raise the
144. For articles asserting that independent placements are as good as or better than licensed-agency placements, see Grove, Independent Adoption: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 VILL. L. REV. 116 (1967), and Rosenstein, Comparative Study of Role Conflict, Marital Adjustment and Personality Configurations of Private and Agency Adoptive Parents
(unpublished dissertation), a summary of which may be found in 20 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS No. 10 at 4208-09 (1960), cited in Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547, 548 n.2 (1975).
For commentary asserting that placements made through licensed child-placing agencies
are superior to those accomplished independently, see Citizens' Committee on the Adoption
of Children (unpublished study), cited in Riti & Shapiro, Evaluation of Agency Service to
Families Who Adopt Privately, 41 CHILD WELFARE 367, 369 (1962); Podolski, supra.
One study found both methods equally defective. H. WITMER, E. HERZOG, E. WEINSTEIN,
& M. SULLIVAN, INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS,
MEEZAN,

S.

ADOPTIONS

KATZ,

& E. Russo,

(1978).

145. See note 135 supra.

A

FOLLOW-UP STUDY (1963).

ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES:

A

See generally W

STUDY OF INDEPENDENT
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child herself, she may opt to keep him and apply for the assistance
rather than put him in foster care or place him with relatives who
may be unwilling to be full-time parents.
Licensed child-placing agencies provide another important service by carefully investigating both the child's background and the
adoptive parents' home. If the child has special medical needs or
other problems not readily apparent, the agency's investigation
may ascertain and disclose to the adoptive parents any conditions
requiring special care or attention. Otherwise, the child may suffer
from lack of needed treatment and the adoptive parents may
change their minds when they discover that the child has special
problems for which they were unprepared. The agency investigation of the adoptive home will help ensure that the adoptive parents are suitable and genuinely willing to raise the child. Independent placements, however, may put the child with parents who are
incapable of providing for his welfare because of either mental or
physical incompetence. Thus, preventive investigation may avoid
many disappointments and difficulties.
A third advantage of agency placements is that the staff is acquainted professionally with the statutory procedures necessary to
effect the adoption properly Chances of errors or omissions are
substantially reduced and adoptions processed through an agency
are more likely to withstand future legal attack. This aspect is especially appealing because it minimizes the chance that the child
will be removed from a secure relationship because an error was
discovered in the procedure. As stated earlier, however, once an
adoption is final, future attacks on all but constitutional grounds
should be foreclosed in order to protect the new relationship.
Enact Preventwe Statutes
Also necessary for protection of the child's welfare when it conflicts with the interests of a biological parent are preventive rather
than remedial statutes. Under many state statutes, a court cannot
terminate a parent's parental rights until it has established that he
has caused positive harm to the child. 146 When the parent is inca146. Cf. Ward v. Faw, - Va. -, 253 S.E.2d 658 (1979) (refusing to terminate parental
rights of the natural father, who had not visited his young son for over three years and was a
complete stranger to him but refused to consent to adoption by the child's stepfather).
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pable of supporting or controlling the child, harm probably will result if the parent is allowed custody, and if nothing indicates that
the parent ever will be fit, courts should have the authority to terminate the parental relationship without a finding of actual
harm.

1 47

Because such a procedure could be used to terminate parental
rights when the parent has a chance of rehabilitating himself, the
evidence of the disability and its probable continuation should be
clear and convincing, and the court should make detailed findings
of fact based on expert opinions. 148 This provision would not permit easy termination of parental rights of those who are even
marginally fit; therefore, it would not interfere with recognizing pa-

rental rights in deserving unwed fathers. Instead, it would enable
courts to terminate parental rights in those situations involving an

ongoing pattern of conduct indicating total disability or disinclinaUnder the Virginia Code, approval of an adoption without the natural father's consent is
allowed when it is withheld contrary to the child's best interests. VA. CODE § 63.1-225(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1977). The Virginia Supreme Court in Ward refused to find that appliation of
this section of the statute was justified by the evidence, stating that when "there is no question of the fitness of the nonconsenting parent and he has not by conduct or previous legal
action lost his rights to the child, it must be shown that continuance of the relationship
between the two would be detrimental to the child's welfare." - Va. at -, 253 S.E.2d at 661
(quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 399, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972)).
147. See, e.g., In re Custody of a Minor, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1117, 389 N.E.2d 68 (1979).
In this case, the court asserted that the state's interest in promoting the welfare of children
could be preventive as well as remedial. If an ongoing pattern of conduct detrimental to the
child's welfare was disclosed and was not rebutted by recent evidence of reform, termination
of parental rights would be justified. Id. at -, 389 N.E.2d at 73.
148. In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979), involved a natural
mother affected by a mental disease that caused her to behave violently. Because she never
had lived with the child and because competent testimony indicated that the chances of
improvement in her condition were slim, the court terminated her parental rights to free the
child for adoption. She appealed, claiming a violation of her substantive due process rights
because her parental rights had been terminated without any showing of actual neglect or
mistreatment. The court indicated that the statute under which her rights were terminated
was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary and emphasized the safeguards used to protect her
rights: the need for testimony by two expert witnesses; a finding that harm probably would
occur to the child if the natural parent were allowed to maintain custody; and the requirement that the evidence be clear and convincing. Citing In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383
A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978), the court emphasized that actual harm to the
child was not a necessary prerequisite to termination of parental rights for neglect. The
court stressed the prophylactic nature of the neglect proceedings, stating that "[tihe avoidance of lasting psychological harm to the child is the compelling state interest behind
prompt severance of the parental relationship." 91 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
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tion to act as a parent. In this way, the child could be placed with
a couple capable of serving as parents before any lasting harm were
done him.
Accord Children Full Legal Representation
A final recommendation necessary to help ensure faithful adherence to the foregoing suggestions is to provide full party status and
representation through a guardian ad litem to any child involved
directly or indirectly in proceedings that may affect his familial
ties. Other parties to an action are not always the best advocates of
the child's interests. Indeed, the current emphasis on protecting
the parental rights of unwed fathers works to deemphasize the importance of the child's needs in the adoption process. Although
parents usually are entrusted with important decisions concerning
their child's future, their mere presence in court indicates that the
family has broken down or failed.149 Under such circumstances,
emotions run high and the child needs an effective voice in the
determination of his future.
Another measure that will ensure full and fair representation of
the child's interests is a requirement of special training for judges
who handle adoption and custody cases. 150 Psychological msight
into the needs of children has progressed to a stage at which a
layman's knowledge is insufficient.151 Adoption proceedings should
149. Apparently, in this context a child is unable to sue his parents for neglect even when
he suffers emotional and psychological injuries. See, e.g., Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588
P.2d 1105 (1978).
150. "In this country the idea that a judge who decides on the removal of a child from his
family, on custody questions, or an adoption should have special training has hardly been
considered." J. POLIER, supra note 114, at 100-01.
151. A number of judges have recognized advances in the knowledge of special needs and
interests of children and*have construed adoption statutes to include concern for the best
interests of the child. See, e.g., Lapinsky v. Shonk, 5 FAM. L. REi. (BNA) 2361 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979). Other judges have continued to construe adoption statutes in accordance with past
assumptions long discredited by modern research. See, e.g., In re Green, 5 FAm. L. REP.
(BNA) 2173, 2175 (N.Y. Far. Ct. 1978) (stating that "the court is not free to disregard
statutory standards or requirements as a basis for decision in favor of sociological principles
that lack the discipline and restraints of law. These must yield to the primacy of law in any
case of apparent conflict.").
Hoy v. Willis, 165 N.J. Super. 265, 398 A.2d 109 (App. Div. 1978), is a particularly good
example of the courts' reservations in applying current psychological learning. A natural
mother on the verge of a nervous breakdown had placed her eighteen-month old child with a
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make greater use of expert witnesses 152 in order to appraise more
accurately the child's needs in light of his individual psychological
and emotional makeup. Also relevant, but not necessarily controlling, should be the child's wishes.' 53 Although most children are
not mature enough to exercise full control over their fate, courts
should accord some consideration to a child's own expression of his
wants and needs.
THE UNWED MOTHER'S INTERESTS

A mother always has played an undeniably central role in the
life of her child, especially in his earliest years. This fact has been
as true for unwed mothers as it has been for those whose children
were born in wedlock. As the Supreme Court explained in Caban,
however, fathers, including unwed fathers, may play an equally im-

paternal aunt who then raised the child until he was over six years old. The natural mother
recovered from her illness and demanded the child back even though she had visited him
only three times in that four-year period. An expert witness testified that the aunt was the
child's psychological parent and that to remove the child would cause a major upset in the
continuity of the child's life with profound psychological complications, and that the child
would require at least seven years to recover from the trauma and depression. The trial
judge then posed the following hypothetical question to the psychiatrist:
If a couple kidnapped an infant, kept it for four years, and within that four
years they became the psychological parents of the child and if both the parents and the kidnappers were equal in all respects, would it be in the best
interests of the child to continue custody with the kidnappers?
Id. at 270, 398 A.2d at 111. When the psychiatrist replied affirmatively, the judge brushed
aside this expert testimony and "preserved" the family unit by returning the child to his
natural mother. Id. at 271, 398 A.2d at 112. The court of appeals reversed, commenting on
the trial judge's failure to recognize the degree to which the theory of psychological parentage had been accepted as a basis for resolving these issues. Id. at 271-72, 276, 398 A.2d at
112-13, 115.
152. Expert testimony can play a key role in the resolution of disputes involving the custody of or parental rights in young children. See, e.g., In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 682,
155 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1979); In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979);
Coffey v. Department of Social Servs., 41 Md. App. 340, 397 A.2d 233 (1979).
153. The concept of consulting the child to determine his desires is not new. In 1824, a
federal court noted that
[w]hen
the court is asked to lend its aid to put the infant into'the custody
of the father, and to withdraw him from other persons, it will look into all the
circumstances, and ascertain whether it will be for the real, permanent interests of the infant; and if the infant be of sufficient discretion, it will also consult its personal wishes.
United States v. Green, 26 F Cas. 30, 31-32 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (emphasis supplied), cited in
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS,

supra note 108, at 81.
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portant role in the child's life, particularly as the child matures.1 "
Legal recognition that "maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance"1 5 caused the dissenting Justices to
voice several concerns. If all unwed fathers are to enjoy parental
rights coextensive with those of unwed mothers, then even fathers
who decline to assume the responsibilities of parenthood would
have an equal voice in decisions regarding the child, and the adoption process would become unnecessarily delayed and complicated.15 6 The requirements of notifying unwed fathers of actions
affecting their parental rights and obtaining their consent to the
adoption also might compromise seriously the privacy of unwed
mothers.1 57 The consequences of delayed adoptions and insistence
that mothers reveal their past sexual habits and partners counsel
careful reconsideration of the competing interests involved.
HistoricalBackground
Under the common law, the unwed mother was responsible for
the nurture and rearing of her nonmarital children. Typically, the
unwed father had no legal duty to provide support for the child
and the few that offered financial help did so out of a sense of
moral obligation. Many more had no desire to undertake the responsibilities of raising a child. Giving birth to a child out of wedlock was a serious moral transgression and the full blame and accountability rested solely with the mother. For men of higher social
standing, the opprobrium associated with fathering a child out of
wedlock forced them not to associate with the unwed mother. In
most cases, therefore, the mother was responsible for raising the
child and providing for his needs.
The law recognized this greater commitment of the mother by
according her the presumption of greater fitness when the father
contested the child's custody 158 This trend continued after the ad-

154. 441 U.S. at 389.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 408-09.
158. Under the common law approach, fathers of legitimate children were entitled to custody of their children as a matter of right. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, that
rule began to give way to the growing concern for the child's welfare. This change in attitude developed into a preference for the mother. Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1380
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vent of adoption statutes that typically gave the unwed mother full
authority to decide whether to place the child for adoption. If she
so decided, the unwed father could not block the adoption, regardless of the relationship he may have had with the child. This practice ended with the decisions in Stanley and Caban. No longer can
adoption statutes favor the unwed mother because of the assumption that her children always are benefited when she has sole control over their destiny Adoption statutes today must be based on
individual considerations of real differences between the parents of
children born out of wedlock. Assessing these differences requires
closer examination of the role of an unwed mother in the life of the
child.
ParentalResponsibilities and Parental Rights
The magnitude of the biological mother's interest in her child
born out of wedlock, in terms of total involvement and direct and
intimate physical and emotional concern, cannot be overstated.
Her role, from before the moment of conception through the
child's infancy, is protected by numerous constitutional and statutory safeguards. She has a constitutional right to use contraceptives 159 and a qualified constitutional right to abortion"1 0 that cannot be vetoed by the father."6 ' In some cases, only she knows the
identity of the father, and she may keep his paternity a secret from
him. Because she carries the child, she must make considerable
changes in her personal and career plans and daily activities. If the
father is disinterested, she may face difficult financial decisions,
compromising her future in order to meet medical expenses. Extensive sociological and anthropological studies indicate evidence
of a special bond between mother and child formed through their
intimate prenatal physical relationship and through the initial con-

(D.C. 1978).
159. This right was guaranteed to married women in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), and extended to unmarried women in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Court in Danforth also
denied parental veto power except, by implication, in the case of incompetent or immature
females: "Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor
daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor
mature enough to have become pregnant." Id. at 75.
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tact following birth.162 The mother is always the identifiable parent
at birth and usually the child's first custodian with constant responsibility for his welfare.
If the unwed mother has not surrendered her child at birth, and
many today do not, her responsibilities continue as the child begins his independent development, and she becomes responsible
for the child's physical and emotional needs. Unless she receives
help from the father, her family, or the state, hers is a full-time
commitment. 163 Clearly, the extent of her parental relationship

with the child guarantees the protection of her parental rights
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Only if
she has neglected or abandoned her child, or is unfit in some other
manner to exercise a parental role, may a court terminate her pa164
rental rights without her consent.
Recommendatins Regarding Differential Treatment of Unwed
Mothers and Unwed Fathers
When the substantial extent of an unwed mother's relationship
with her newborn child is compared to that of a disinterested un162. See, e.g., 1 J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1969); 2 J. BOWLiY, ATTACHMENT AND
Loss (1973); M. MAHLER, THE PSYCHOLOGIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN INFANT (1976),
cited in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 405 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. This was essentially Justice Stevens's argument in his Caban dissent. Citing HEW
statistics showing that most adoptions involve infants or very young children, he found the
differences in the roles and responsibilities of unwed fathers and unwed mothers of children
in that age group substantial enough to justify differential treatment favoring the unwed
mother without offending the equal protection clause. 441 U.S. at 404-05 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Stewart contended that gender-based distinctions properly could be made because
unwed fathers and unwed mothers were not similarly situated. Buttressing this stance was
his finding that the "vast majority" of unwed fathers are "unknown, unavailable, or simply
uninterested." Id. at 398-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing H. CLARK, supra note 23, at 17677; H. KRAUSE, supra note 94, at 29-32 (1971)).
164. See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Child by I.T., 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (App.
Div. 1978) (allowing termination of the natural mother's rights when she abandoned her
child and refused to assume parental duties); Costello v. Denninger, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2883 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (allowing termination of the natural mother's parental rights
when the child who had cystic fibrosis got necessary special daily care from the adoptive
parents that the natural mother was unable to give); In re Adoption of Baby Boy P., 479 Pa.
138, 387 A.2d 873 (1978) (allowing termination of the natural mother's parental rights when
she did nothing for her child in the first eighteen months of his life except demand $3,000 to
consent to his adoption).
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wed father, common sense dictates a strong basis for differential
treatment. Given that the majority of unwed fathers in fact is disinterested and that the majority of adoptions involve infants, the
need to treat unwed fathers differently by presuming them unfit in
order to prevent undue delay and complications in the adoption
process is of great social importance. To be acceptable constitutionally, though, any such presumption must be rebuttable rather
than conclusive. This approach enables those particular unwed fathers who have participated fully in the child's nurturing and support to obtain the full parental rights they have earned. At the
same time, the presumption allows courts to dispense with the
need for the unwed father's consent when he has not come forward
with evidence rebutting the presumption and to terminate quickly
the rights of the great-majority of unwed fathers who have assumed no parental duties.
This presumption of unfitness should be coupled with a stricter
definition of neglect in the case of newborn infants. If the court
finds that the unwed father has not assumed his parental responsibilities within ninety days of the child's birth, his parental rights
should be terminated in order to free the child for adoption before
irreparable harm occurs to the child. Because this procedure does
not foreclose interested unwed fathers from defending their parental rights, it probably is consistent with the Court's rulings in
Caban, Quilloin, and Stanley This procedure also accommodates
the concerns of the Caban dissenters because it allows speedy termination of the parental rights of disinterested unwed fathers like
Leon Quilloin who lack substantial relationships with their children when such termination is in the child's best interests. This
expedition is critical to the newborn child's welfare.
The adoption of an older child may involve competing interests
far different from those in a newborn adoption. Because maternal
and paternal roles are more similar for older children, the factual
basis for differential treatment is considerably weaker. In Caban,
the Court underscored the necessity of evaluating maternal and
paternal claims to the child on an individual basis. Also, an older
child often is more secure psychologically than an infant and better able to understand and adapt to changes in the makeup of his
family Additionally, time is less critical for older children and they
are better able to tolerate limited delays in the adoption process.
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For these reasons, the presumption of unfitness of unwed fathers
operative in newborn adoptions should not apply to adoptions involving older children. Instead, the court should determine from a
preponderance of the evidence whether the particular unwed father has had a relationship with his child of sufficient character to
guarantee it against termination on grounds other than unfitness.
Courts are in a much better position to make this determination
when an older child is involved because they are able to examine
the unwed father's behavior toward his child over a number of
years.
Notice to the Unwed Father v. The Mother's Privacy
One aspect of the adoption process that poses problems for the
unwed mother is the need to identify the unwed father so he may
be given notice that action is pending that may affect his parental
rights. Some authorities assert that a woman's constitutional right
of privacy protects her from forced disclosure of information regarding her sexual and childbearing activities. 1 5 Many mothers are
embarrassed and suffer emotional stress when questioned regarding their sexual partners. Other mothers will avoid the questioning
altogether by placing the child themselves or through an unlicensed intermediary."" 8 Those mothers who may not object to confidential disclosure to a social worker may object when notice must
be published in a newspaper or posted in a public place. Whatever
degree of privacy they had retained in the private disclosure is lost
when they are identified to the world as unwed mothers. Women
question the need for notice by publication because the chances
are so slim that the unwed father actually will receive notice. Also,
notifying the father delays the adoption process to the child's
detriment.
165. See, e.g., Vermont Att'y Gen. Op. No. 997 (1972). The opinion states that
[tjhe father's parental rights and the mother's right of privacy are each recognized as fundamental human rights, and it would be cruel and unseemly for
the Department to compel a woman to be subjected to possible personal
trauma in order to give the father his right to appear as a parent, where the
mother does not seek legal relief for herself.
Id. at 6. See also Barron, supra note 1, at 542.
166. W MEEZAN, S. KATz, & E. Russo, supra note 144; see Bodenheiner, supra note 121,
at 62-63.
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The Supreme Court, however, clearly has stated that unwed fathers must be notified of any legal action that may affect their parental rights. 6 " When the unwed father has assumed significant
parental responsibilities, his right to the control, custody, and companonship of his child is just as great as that of an unwed mother.
Procedural due process requires at least notice and an opportunity
to be heard 6 s before parental rights can be terminated."6 9 Although a majority of the Supreme Court never has addressed the
conflict between the mother's privacy and the father's notice, they
have referred consistently to the necessity for notice even to unwed
fathers whose identity and whereabouts are unascertainable.
The Court recognized in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.1 70 that chances of actual notice through publication
alone are slim,17 ' but stated that such notice may satisfy procedural due process requirements. 7 2 Although a great majority of unwed fathers would not respond even if they did receive actual notice, those who might respond have a substantial interest and

167. Although some commentators have urged a much more restricted interpretation of
Supreme Court statements regarding notice to unwed fathers, see, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra
note 121, at 63, the Court may have intended to attach broader significance to their remarks. Notice to the unwed father was not at issue in Stanley, Quillom, or Caban; nevertheless, the Court discussed its sufficiency in each case. Although in Stanley and Cabanthis
construction might have been consonant with a narrow interpretation of the need for notice
because those unwed fathers were determined to have constitutionally protected interests,
its inclusion in Quilloin, in which the unwed father's interest was not of constitutional magnitude, undercuts the narrow interpretation. Just as Caban forbade the states to presume
unwed fathers unfit, perhaps it also proscribed presumptions that notice to the unwed father was unnecessary if the possiblity of actually notifying him was slim or if he might lack
a constitutionally protectea interest.
168. Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require
that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
169. See, e.g., Canaday v. Gresham, 362 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
notice is a fundamental prerequisite to adoption).
170. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
171. Id. at 315.
172. Id. at 317. "Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all
that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing
their rights." Id. (citing Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912); Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1
(1911); Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905)).
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deserve the opportunity to defend it. 17 3
Requiring an unwed mother to name the father may not infringe
her right to privacy impermissibly, 1 74 provided that the inquiry is
limited to the identity of the unwed father.1 75 Because the interests
of a third party, the child, are at stake, the issue of disclosure is
broader than individual privacy The embarrassment that may result to certain unwed mothers from disclosing the father's name
and whereabouts is outweighed by the interest of protecting the
rights of genuinely concerned unwed fathers.
Recommendations Regarding Notice
For the reasons stated above, the unwed mother should be required to identify the unwed father or possible unwed fathers if
she knows who they are. 6 Failure to identify should be treated as
contempt only if the evidence tends to show that her refusal is motivated by a desire to deprive the unwed father of the opportunity
to assert and defend his parental rights. After an unsuccessful good

173. Due process requires "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1914); Roller v.
Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900)).
174. This was the view adopted in the Uniform Parentage Act. UNiFORM PARENTAGE ACT
§ 10(b), 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 600 (master ed. 1979).
175. In Doe v. Norton, 365 F Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S.
391 (1975), the court emphasized, in the context of compelling unwed mothers to identify
the unwed father in order to hold him liable for support payments, that
the inquiry focuses on the identity of the father, not on the mother's misconduct. The question asked of the unwed mother is, "Who is the father of your
child?" The object of the inquiry is to enforce a familial monetary obligation,
not to interfere with personal privacy. There is no intrusion into the home nor
any participation in interpersonal decisions among its occupants
The
only restriction it imposes upon either the unwed mother or the biological father to do as they please or make any decisions they wish in whatever relationship they desire to maintain is that the father satisfy his legal obligation to
support his own child and that the mother provide what information she possesses useful toward that end.
Id. at 77-78.
176. For example, a California statute requires a court to ask the unwed mother or other
appropriate person whether the mother was married or cohabiting during or after conception, whether the mother has received any support or promises of support, and whether
anyone has acknowledged or openly declared his possible paternity. CAL. Civ. CODE §
7017(c) (West Supp. 1979).
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faith effort to identify, the court should order that notice be published. 17 7 Such notice, to be meaningful,7 s must contain the
mother's name17 but need not identify the child or adoptive parents. 1 0 The length of time required for its publication should depend on the circumstances of the particular case."" For newborn
adoptions when the unwed father's identity and whereabouts are
unknown and actual notification appears futile, publication for
fifteen days should suffice.' 82 If, however, the father's identity and
general location are known and an older child is involved, publication for thirty days should be required. This approach would ensure a good faith effort to notify the unwed father but avoid unnecessary delay in the adoption process' 8 and undue

177. Some authorities suggest that courts dispense with the need for notice if it appears
that it will be futile. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 1, at 545-46. California has such a provision in its adoption law that allows a court to dispense with notice when the father's identity and whereabouts are unknown. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7017(f) (West Supp. 1979). The constitutionality of such a statute is unclear. See note 167 supra.
Also proposed as a substitute for publication of notice if the unwed father's identity and
location are unknown is a time limitation. "[T]he court must try to ascertain the identity of
the father, but very speedy termination of his potential rights may be had if he shows no
interest in the child or if a reasonable effort provides no clue to his identity" within a
specified period of time. Krause, The Uniform ParentageAct, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 14 (1974)
(emphasis original) (citing UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 24(c), (d), (e)).
178. "[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.
The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might
reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
at 315.
179. Any attempt to notify the unwed father without disclosing the unwed mother's name
is little more than an empty gesture. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 1, at 544-45.
180. Exclusion of the name of the adoptive parents from the notice given the unwed father is advisable to forestall any possibility of interference or harrassment. One court, however, has indicated that the notice should include enough general information about the
adoptive parents that the unwed father may decide whether it is in his or the child's best
interests for him to appear at the hearing. In re "Male F," 97 Misc. 2d 505, 411 N.Y.S.2d
982 (Sur. Ct. 1978).
181. When a state has an interest in bringing issues to final settlement, "[a] construction
of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way
could not be justified." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 313-14.
182. Cf. In re Adoption of Daft, - W Va. -, 230 S.E.2d 475 (1976) (accepting fourteen
days notice to the unwed father who was a fugitive from justice and whose whereabouts
were unknown).
183. Because of the importance to the child of reducing the time needed to complete an
adoption, courts should not hesitate to dispense with methods of giving notice, other than
that of publication, that are obviously futile. For example, in In re Minique J., 5 FA. L.
REP. (BNA) 2542 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1979), § 111(a) of the New York Domestic Relations Law
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embarrassment." 4
THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER'S INTEREST

Historically, the law has been biased strongly against recognizing
in the unwed father any rights to his children born out of wedlock.
Although fathers of children born in wedlock had exclusive entitlement to the child's custody, often an unwed father was not even
recognized as a parent of his nonmarital child.185 Only the
mother' 6 was so recognized, probably because the father's identity
was uncertain and because he was stereotyped as irresponsible and
unconcerned 8 7 about his child. Initially, most states felt the unwed
father had no connection with his child born out of wedlock other
than the moral obligation of support.' 88 Indeed, before Stanley,
even if the unwed father had acknowledged paternity, supported
the child, and established a family relationship with him, courts
seldom recognized the father's interests.' 9
With the decision in Stanley, the practice of ignormg the unwed
father ended, 190 thereby substantially altering the course of adoprequired notice to the unwed father by registered or certified mail when personal service
failed. The last known address of the unwed father was a vacant, boarded-up building. The
court, realizing the waste of time and money that would ensue from attempting to effect
personal service, dispensed with the requirement and directed that only notice by mail be
sent.
184. "But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. 'The criterion is
not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the statute deals."' Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 314-15 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219
U.S. 47, 67 (1911)).
185. W RODGERS, DoMEsTic RELATIONS §§ 561, 569 (1899).
186. The child born out of wedlock was often vewed as the "child of nobody," that is, the
child of no known body except its mother. See Note, 58 NEB. L. REv., supra note 1, at 61011 (citing Re M, [1955] 2 All E.R. 911, 912).
187. See Tabler, supra note 1, at 231.
188. See Note, 50 MINN. L. REV., supra note 1, at 1072.
189. See Comment, 13 J. FAm. L., supra note 1, at 115 (citing Clements v. Banks, 159 So.
2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Toole v. Gallion, 221 Ga. 494, 144 S.E.2d 360 (1965)).
190. When asked to comment on this recent reversal in attitudes toward the unwed father, a social services specialist advanced two reasons for the change. The first was the growing tendency to judge people on their individual merits rather than on the basis of stereotypes. She described this as a natural outgrowth of the increased concern for the individual
in today's society. The second reason was that a greater number of unwed fathers are willing
to undertake parental responsibilities. She felt that this change was due to the recent exam-

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:85

tion law. The Court clearly held in Stanley and Caban that full
parental rights must be extended to those unwed fathers who had
substantial parental relationships with their children. The Court,
however, also indicated in Quilloin that not all unwed fathers merited a role in the adoption process equal to that of the natural
mother. The determination of an unwed father's rights involves
several factors. All unwed fathers at least are entitled to notice and
a chance to be heard before their parental rights can be terminated. Any additional substantive rights to which they may be entitled depends on the quality of their relationship with their children. The guidelines established in Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban
address these issues but also raise others. These further questions
concern the exact nature of the relationship that an unwed father
must establish with his child in order to receive constitutional protection. Once a father establishes such a relationship, the issue
then will focus on how to preserve the constitutional guarantees.
Establishing the Parental Relationship
The unwed father's first connection with his child is established
upon conception. Aside from the special questions raised by the
use of artificial insemination and substitute mothers as means of
conceiving children, 19' the biological link between parent and child
always has been recognized as capable of creating a mutual family

ination and redefinition of sex roles that have prompted men to feel capable of raising a
child alone. Interview with Carolyn Byers, Social Worker, Unwed Mother Specialist, Hampton Department of Social Services, in Hampton, Virginia (Oct. 4, 1979).
This emerging sensitivity to the father's role in child rearing could undermine significantly many of the assumptions inherent in the adoption process. For instance, as indicated
by two other social services specialists, placement agencies now are allowing single men to
adopt children. Despite the still widespread belief that two-parent homes are inherently
superior to one-parent homes, adoption agencies are finding that one-parent homes can be
perfectly suitable and constitute a valuable adoption resource, especially for the older or
physically or emotionally disabled children who have been the most difficult to place. Interview with Mary Hutchens, Senior Social Worker, Adoptive Home Developer, and Sharon
Downes, Senior Social Worker, Foster Care Intake Worker, Newport News Department of
Social Services, Newport News, Virginia (Oct. 4, 1979). See generally FATHERS, HUSBANDS
AND LovERS (S. Katz & Inker eds. 1979).
191. See note 124 supra. The Uniform Parentage Act provides that when a married
couple has a child through the use of artificial insemination, the husband, not the sperm
donor, is considered the natural father. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9A UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 558 (master ed. 1979).
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interest of each in the other.192 In the past, however, the biological
connection alone was insufficient to accord full parental rights to
the unwed father. 193 As Justice Stewart remarked inhis Caban dissent, "[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between
parent and child. They require relationships
4
more enduring.

'19

An unwed father takes a step toward a more enduring relationship when he either acknowledges his paternity and duty to support the child or "legitimates" his child through the statutory process provided by the state.9

5

Acknowledging paternity and

supporting the child in certain instances has been sufficient to establish fully the unwed father's parental rights;198 however, such
conduct alone does not guarantee substantial rights in the child.
Failure to provide support when legally owed has been enough to
terminate some unwed fathers' parental rights. 97
In addition to financial support, many courts require that before
192. The Supreme Court, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816
(1977), noted that "the usual understanding of 'family' implies biological relationships, and
most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have stressed this element."
Id. at 843 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). Although the father's interest in his biological child may be apparent from the beginning, the child does not begin to develop a corresponding interest in his biological father until he has aged beyond his early years.
193. In another context, several Justices asserted that a biological relationship alone was
insufficient to create a constitutionally protected family. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 535-40 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
194. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
195. In Quillom, the appellees argued that although parental rights were constitutionally
protected, failure to use the statutory method of legitimation, in the case of disinterested
unwed fathers like Leon Quillom, could cause the unwed father's interest in the child to be
subordinated to the unwed mother's parental rights. The Court indicated it would hesitate
to consider this factor controlling because many unwed fathers were unaware that legitimation procedures are available. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 254. The Kansas Supreme
Court in Aslin v. Seamon, 225 Kan. 77, 587 P.2d 875 (1978), took this same view in stating
that whether the father has legitimized his children is irrelevant to his right of notice and to
custody in adoption proceedings.
196. Cf. Aslin v. Seamon, 225 Kan. at 81-82, 587 P.2d at 879 (holding the father's consent
alone sufficient for adoption when the unwed mother may have abandoned the child and the
father has acknowledged paternity).
197. See, e.g., Young v. Foster, 148 Ga. App. 737, 252 S.E.2d 680 (1979) (allowing adoption by the stepfather without the father's consent because he had abandoned his child by
willful and wanton failure to pay court-ordered child support); State ex reL. Haynes, 368 So.
2d 783 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (permitting adoption without the father's consent because of his
refusal to comply with the spirit of the support order).
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the unwed father is accorded full paternal rights, he must establish
a personal relationship with the child""8 and assume some of the
personal duties of child raising such as actual or legal custody for a
period of time, or responsibility for the daily supervision, education, care, and protection of the child. 199 Indeed, the establishment
of such a relationship may be the critical ingredient in forming a
constitutionally protected "family" The cases cited in Stanley,
Quilloin, and Caban concerning the right to custody and control of
one's children all incorporated the idea that recognition of parental
rights depends on assumption of parental duties.
For example, the Court in Quilloin cited Meyer v. Nebraska200
for the proposition that the "rights to conceive and to raise one's
children" were "essential.

' 201

In Stanley, the Court observed fur-

ther that the "interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children" deserved great respect2 02 and in Prince v. Massachusetts,0s " the Court cited as a
cardinal principle that the "custody, care and nurture" of the child
resided primarily in the parents, "whose primary function and
freedom" included preparing the child for life's obligations.0 4 Also
significant was the "integrity of the family unit."20 5 Family units
formed without a marital relationship between the parents still
warranted constitutional recognition because "familial bonds in
such cases were often as warm, enduring, and important as those
arising within a more formally organized family unit.' 2 0 6
198. See, e.g., In re Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1, 387 A.2d 804 (1978). Under the
Pennsylvania adoption act, parental obligations are more than financial; failure to establish
a relationship with the child for six months terminates parental rights. Id. at -, 387 A.2d at
807.
199. Some states require at least communication between the unwed father and his child.
See, e.g., Rosell v. Dausman,_ Ind. App. -, 373 N.E.2d 185 (1978). The intent of the statute
allowing the court to dispense with the consent of the noncustodial parent if that parent
had failed to communicate with the child for one year was to encourage communication with

children.
200. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

201.
202.
(1949)
203.
204.
205.
(1965);
206.

Id. at 399-401 (emphasis supplied).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 166, cited tn Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
405 U.S. at 652 (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968)).
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In a slightly different context, the Court in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families0 1 stated that
the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and
from the role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life" through the
instruction of
children,
as well as from the fact of blood
208
relationship.
This familial relationship was an important factor in the Supreme
Court's upholding of Abdiel Caban's and Peter Stanley's parental
rights; the lack of such a relationship prompted the Court's rejection of Leon Quilloin's parental rights. Indeed, upholding his interests would have resulted in destroying an established "family"
unit. The Court in Caban stated that nothing in the equal protection clause prevented a state from denying an unwed father who
had never participated in the rearing of his child a veto power over
the child's adoption." 9 When the unwed father had such a parental relationship with his child, however, the equal protection clause
prohibited treating unwed fathers differently from unwed
mothers.21 0
Recommendations for Recognizing a Constitutionally Sufficient
ParentalRelationship
The criteria for judging the sufficiency of an unwed father's parental relationship with his older child were discussed in Stanley,
Quilloin, and Caban. The relevant indicia of parenthood in those
cases were living with the child in a de facto family unit and providing for his care, supervision, support, and education. Factors
held to be insufficient in themselves were mere biological relationship, acknowledgment of paternity, irregular support, occasional
visits, and interest only in future visitation privileges. Although
these determinations may be relatively easy to make when an older
child is concerned and the court can judge the unwed father's per-

207.
208.
209.
210.

431 U.S. 816 (1977).
Id. at 844 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)).
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 392.
Id. at 393.
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formance record over several years, the opposite is true when a
young or newborn infant is concerned. Courts are not entirely
without guidance, though, on how to approach this problem. The
focus still is on whether the unwed father is concerned and interested, and his parental conduct is relevant in making that
determination.
One factor that may tend to indicate the degree of interest and
concern the father will have in the child is the interest he takes in
the child's mother. Because the fetus's welfare is directly dependent on his mother's welfare, assuming the part of a responsible
parent toward the child entails a willingness to aid the mother
when she needs assistance. The degree of interest the unwed father
has displayed will depend on whether he helped support the
mother during her pregnancy, provided for her specific medical
needs, contributed to the expenses of delivery, acknowledged his
paternity and support obligations, gave the child his name, and entered his name as father on the child's birth certificate.
The above concerns are among those expected of a responsible
father. Failure to participate during this phase of the child's life
should create a rebuttable presumption that the unwed father is
uninterested in his child's welfare and therefore has neglected him.
The unwed father should be allowed to rebut this presumption by
showing that he did all that any interested father would do to assure the newborn's welfare. Even though married fathers are
presumed fit, the creation of this presumption of unfitness of the
unwed father would be fair and reasonable on two grounds. First,
the married father has assumed, by virtue of his marriage, many
obligations in regard to his child's welfare, primarily the obligation
to support the child. In the majority of cases, he also supports the
mother and provides for her well-being while she carries the child.
When the child is born, he is born "legitimate" and takes his father's name, thus avoiding the problems associated with birth out
of wedlock. Second, the unwed father's interests often oppose both
the interest of the child in having an active, caring father and the
interest of the state in assuring the welfare of nonmarital children.
Thus, the unwed father's interests are not absolute and must yield
to the other interests involved when the father has refused to assume the parental responsibilities that are the obverse side of parental rights.
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For these reasons, when an unwed mother desires to place her
child for adoption at birth, failure of the unwed father to rebut the
presumption of disinterest arising from his conduct before the
child's birth should be sufficient to order termination of his parental rights if such termination is found to be in the child's best interests. If the arrangements for adoption are made before the child
is born, the court should contact and advise the father that he
must at least acknowledge paternity and his obligation to support
the child or he will lose his rights for failure to rebut the presumption of disinterest and neglect. Of course, if he cannot be identified
or located, his rights should be terminated after publication of notice for the minimum period. Both the mother and child greatly
need the father's assistance during late pregnancy and Immediately
following birth. If he is unwilling to provide that assistance, he
should not be legally recognized as a father.
Should the mother decide to place the child several months after
birth, a court should apply a strict definition of neglect or abandonment to terminate the father's rights if he still has displayed no
paternal interest. Conversely, should the father assume an active
parental role, he should have full parental rights.
In determining whether the unwed father has had a significant
parental relationship with the child, the court should examine the
reality of the situation rather than base its decision on mere formalities. The focus should be on the degree to which the unwed
father actually has undertaken to discharge his parental duties, not
on whether he has made some token effort. The father sometimes
may be frustrated m his attempts to assume an active parental role
by the mother's behavior or by his incarceration. In such cases, the
proper determination should be whether he has taken all those essential steps that a truly interested father would or could have
taken to be a parent to his child, such as seeking custody, visiting
or communicating with the child, assisting in the child's support,
and planning for the child's future.
Recommendations for Protecting the Unwed Father's Parental
Relationship
When an unwed father has had a significant parental relationship with his child, the interest of all parties is promoted if the law
fully protects that relationship. Even when the existence of this
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relationship seems questionable, the fundamental nature of the interest dictates that the unwed father be able to defend his interests at a hearing. The Supreme Court has decided that, at a minimum, unwed fathers are entitled to the procedural protection of
notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Giving actual notice to an absent or unknown unwed father may
present great difficulties. When adoption is in the child's best interests and the father's absence and anonymity are due to his lack
of concern for the mother and child, termination of his parental
rights poses few difficulties if he fails to respond promptly to published notice. The father's absence, however, may have other
causes. The mother may have refused to identify him as the father
or may have claimed she did not know who he was or where he
resided. Alternatively, she may have taken the child and deserted
him, moving to a new area where she could place the child for
adoption without any interference from the father. Whether the
mother acted with good or bad motives, the unwed father deserves
an opportunity to be heard before his parental rights are terminated. Balanced against his right to be heard, however, are the
state's interest in proceeding with adoptions as quickly as is consonant with due process, and the child's interest in avoiding a
lengthy period of legal and familial limbo.
One method of protecting unwed fathers who have been deserted
that would not delay adoptions would be to allow them to preregister their parental interest with the state so that they would be
assured of actual notice whenever any action comes before the
state's courts affecting their interests. Through inclusion of this
provision in interstate adoption compacts already in existence, this
protection could be extended over a greater area. Although many
unwed fathers might be unaware of this procedure, those interested enough to attempt to locate their children could be informed
about it through inquiries to state agencies. Those unwed fathers
unaware of these provisions would most likely be those who were
least interested and did not even bother to make inquiries. Still,
those unwed fathers who never are actually notified stand to lose
parental rights they may have earned; however, this seemingly
harsh result is justified by the child's need for establishing permanent relationships as soon as possible to prevent emotional trauma.
An unwed father who receives actual notice then must clear the
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hurdle of proving he in fact is the child's biological father.211 This
requirement serves two purposes. First, it satisfies the state's legitimate interest in assuring that a parental veto is not given to one
who is not in fact the child's father. Second, it comports with the
interest of the child and the state in having the father acknowledge
his support obligations. If the mother disputes his assertion, a paternity hearing may resolve the controversy. Once the unwed father has proved paternity, he can offer evidence on the existence
and nature of his relationship with his child. The quality and extent of the evidence necessary to guarantee substantive protection
of his parental rights should vary depending on the child's age, the
extent to which the unwed father has had or sought custody, his
relationship with the child, and the effect of termination of his parental rights on a de facto family unit. If the court determines that
no substantial parental relationship exists, it should order termination of parental rights when termination is in the child's best interests. When a substantial parental relationship exists, however, the
unwed father should be accorded full substantive protection of his
rights. Termination should take effect only after proof of actual
unfitness and when it is in the child's best interests.
Necessary to the protection of the indigent unwed father's parental rights is provision for court-appointed counsel. Although
adoption proceedings are classified as civil actions, the unwed fa212
ther may find the influence and power of the state opposing him,
211. The state has a legitimate interest in providing that an unwed father's right to veto
an adoption is contingent upon his showing that the child is his. Id. at 393 n.15 (citing for
comparison Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274 (1978)).
Although some statutes require that an unwed father be adjudged the child's natural father before the adoption petition is filed, the better practice is to allow unwed fathers to
assert their claims any time before the petition is granted. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Infant
Male, - Ind. App. -, 378 N.E.2d 885 (1978).
212. The unwed father also faces the power of the state in paternity hearings, Normally,
an unwed mother who receives welfare from the state in order to support her child is compelled to assist the state in collecting an equivalent amount from the unwed father. The
California Supreme Court recently declared that indigent unwed fathers sued for support by
unwed mothers on behalf of the state were entitled to have court-appointed counsel because, unlike other civil actions, the "full power of the state is pitted against the indigent
person in an adjudication of the existence of a fundamental biological relationship entailing
serious financial, legal, and moral obligatons." Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 32, 593 P.2d
226, 233, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 536 (1979). Also at stake in such hearings is a liberty interest
because the unwed father may be jailed for nonsupport. Hepfel v. Bashaw, - Minn. -, 279
N.W.2d 342 (1979).
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for example, when the state's department of welfare actively supports the termination of his parental rights. This involvement of
the state in terminating a fundamental interest of the unwed father alters the nature of the adoption proceeding, giving it certain
aspects of a criminal proceeding. When this occurs, the indigent
unwed father should be assured of competent counsel to defend his
rights.
CONCLUSION

An unwed father's relationship with his nonmarital children may
be as close and compelling as that of any other parent. The Supreme Court recognized this principle by prescribing a greater degree of procedural and substantive protection for the parental
rights of unwed fathers. The scope of this protection is determined
principally by the extent to which the particular unwed father assumes the role and responsibilities of a concerned parent. No
longer may unwed fathers conclusively be presumed unfit in order
to expedite adoption proceedings; every father deserves an opportumty to defend his parental rights. This precept must be qualified, however, by the necessity of equitably accommodating the
rights and interests of the other parties to an adoption. Thus, concern for effecting actual notice to the unwed father must be tempered by respect for the unwed mother's privacy and recognition of
the necessity of minimal disruption of the child's psychological and
emotional relationships. Because time is a critical factor in most
adoptions, courts must be prepared to terminate an unwed father's
parental rights when reasonable, good faith attempts to notify him
of the action fail and such termination is in the child's best interests. Reasonableness, of course, will depend on the circumstances
of each case. When actual notice is effected, recognition of enhanced substantive rights in unwed fathers depends on a delicate
balancing of the various interests competing in the adoption process. Provided this determination is performed in a manner that
guarantees consideration of the individual characteristics of the
parties involved, the conclusion reached will be in the best interests of all concerned.
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